COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"I am confounded when I look at the probable consequences of this measure" [Restriction on the "Bank]. "It will be dreadful, indeed, if these notes, instead of money, should become assignats; "and I fear it will be so. Paper is only a good thing while we have the means of converting it into "cash. We shall not long be able, after the inundation of paper to which this system gives birth, "to stop Ministers from making Bank Notes a legal tender, and then, adieu to the appearance of "specie at the Bank, and soon afterwards to the real value of the Bank Note!—I may be blamed at "such an awful crisis for speaking so plainly; but plain dealing is now the only method to recover "Public Credit."——MR. SHERIDAN'S SPEECH, MARCH 1, 1797.

TO THE EDITOR.

Gredington, Dec. 12, 1803.

SIR,—Having before troubled you under the signature of Cambricus, on account of the apparently wilful attack on my most honoured father's memory, I think it right to trouble you to insert this, to state my perfect satisfaction at the amends, which, for his own character's sake, and that of the public, I am happy to see a writer of such powers and zeal as Juverna has so handsomely made. On that point alone I will trouble you; and am glad to use the opportunity of signing myself your sincere admirer and humble servant,

KENYON.

TO THE EDITOR.

Durweston Street, Dec. 12, 1803.

SIR,—As I am well convinced that you have the good of his Majesty's service most sincerely at heart, and that you would not willingly, without cause, wound the feelings of military men, I take the liberty of offering my mite towards rescuing the Inspecting Field Officers of the recruiting service from any ill effects which the remarks of Marcellus might occasion; and I do this with considerable confidence, from having been a constant reader of your opinions from the first introduction of the Political Register.——Marcellus must be ignorant, that the Inspecting Field Officers act under the following regulations, viz. *Men* for the light cavalry must be five feet seven inches, and not more than twenty-five years of age; *Boys* for the same service must be five feet five, and under eighteen years of age. ——It is in the power of every commanding officer of a regiment to reject all recruits under size or above age; in which case the Inspecting Field Officer is liable to the whole charge for bounty and subsistence, should his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief confirm the opinion of the commanding officer of the regiment.—— Marcellus seems not to be aware, that in consequence of foreign service, some latitude is allowable in recruiting for the infantry, viz. older men for the West and younger for the East-Indies, which measure has been fully justified by experience; for which reason it sometimes happens, that recruits who have been rejected for the cavalry, as being too old, too young, or under size, are permitted to enlist for general service without quitting the Field Officer's office.——As it would be highly improper in me, for very obvious reasons, to urge any thing in answer to Marcellus's assertion, that those Field Officers are, almost without any exception, taken from the infantry; I shall only observe, that the infantry half-pay list is, at least, thirty times greater than that of the cavalry; and as the inspection of recruits for the latter service is so plain, there can be no particular reason why a Cavalry Officer should be placed in the command of a district, in preference to one from the infantry, who, in general possess more experience, from greater length and variety of service.——There is, at this time, a recruiting party from almost every light cavalry regiment stationed in London, I have no hesitation in referring Marcellus to any one of those officers for information as to the manner in which my duty is performed, and I am confident that my brother Field Officers can, with equal truth, exculpate themselves from any charge of partiality and caprice in the execution of their important duty.——I have the honour to subscribe myself, Sir, your obedient humble servant,

F. P. ROBINSON,
Inspecting Field Officer, London District.

TO THE EDITOR.

London, Dec. 13, 1803.

SIR,—I am a constant reader of your Register, and have always perfectly acquiesced in your remarks and observations on the Volunteers, though I myself have the *honour* of belonging to such a corps.

——The debates of last night are now before me, and I can with safety corroborate Mr. Windham's assertions respecting the Volunteers, and particularly as far as regards their *Committees*, which, in too many instances shew the impolicy and folly of the institution, as far as relates to all *military* affairs.—— How is it possible that hair dressers, taylors, shoe-makers, pastry-cooks, and such people, should be able to judge of the merits or demerits of officers? In some corps, however, the regulation of the *seniority* of the officers, *elected by the corps*, has been entirely left to such a committee, who, I may say, have decided by partiality for *old customers*, or in favour of *the purse*, instead of fitness for the station. Indeed, from the most undoubted authority, I may further add, that in one corps, which carries its plumes very loftily, and which, from its strength, title and respectability, ought to be ranked among the first, there are several *experienced* officers, who have served in various situations on foreign stations, for many years, and who are still in their prime, that have, *as Volunteers*, been placed the juniors of their rank, and this by a Committee; because the heads of the corps were fearful that, by doing their duty, they might offend the *weighty gentlemen*, or lose their popularity in the corps, which, it is much to be lamented, appears in all matters, a principal consideration.——When the *gentlemen* privates of the Volunteers exclaim: "let us have none for officers "who can't give us good dinners;" how can it be expected that such people can ever become *disciplined*; and particularly when the corps have chosen their field officers by that rule? Men who, in private life, may be respectable merchants, and good members of society (judging alone by their *income*), but who have not, nor *ever can* attain a military idea, and who cannot even give the word to *fire a volley* with propriety. I entirely agree with Mr. Pitt, that, if any good is to be expected from Volunteer Corps, it must be by giving them *a head*; a field officer who merits, and will command attention and respect, a man to whom the officers and privates can look up with confidence, as able to conduct them upon all occasions; not one who requires an adjutant or serjeant-major at his ear, before he can even direct the men to shoulder their arms.——You, Mr. Cobbett, well know, that it is the commanding officer, on whom every thing chiefly depends; that the best battalion in the service will, by an unlucky change of its head, soon become the worst; and *vice versâ*. How much more, then, must an undisciplined luxurious body of cits require to be ably commanded.——Yours, &c.

MENTOR.

AN

ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW

Of two Pamphlets, lately published, the one entitled "Cursory Remarks upon the State of Parties during the Administration of Mr. Addington, by a NEAR OBSERVER;" *and the other entitled, "A Plain Answer to the Misrepresentations and Calumnies contained in the Cursory Remarks of a Near Observer, by* A MORE ACCURATE OBSERVER."

Merely as literary performances, these pamphlets are by no means entitled to particular attention; but, as developing the party views of the late and of the present minister, as discovering some of those secret wheels on which the interests and honour of the nation are made to turn, they are of great public importance. Such being their nature and use, it is evident, that some explanation as to their *origin* ought to precede an examination of the facts and arguments advanced in them.

That the Cursory Remarks could not be written without information, received, either directly or indirectly, from Mr. Addington, is pretty certain; because they state the very words of conversations, which took place between Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt only. The author of this pamphlet is a Mr. Bentley; or, at least, the proof sheets were carried from the bookseller's to Mr. Bentley, by whom, after their being corrected, they were sent back to the bookseller's. It is said, that Mr. Sarjeant, one of the Secretaries of the Treasury, carried the materials from the minister to Mr. Bentley: for the truth of this fact, I will not answer: indeed I know nothing at all about it; but, I do know, that, on the 15th of October last, the Treasury had purchased seven hundred and fifty copies of the work, five hundred of which were cut close to the print, in order to render them more convenient for conveyance by post. These facts make Mr. Addington a party to the Cursory Remarks: they do, indeed, make him answerable for every word of that pamphlet, as fully, to all intents and purposes, as if he himself had been the author, with his name inserted in the title-page.——

The Plain Answer, as evidently, comes, if not from under the hand, at least, from under the eye, of Mr. Pitt. It is generally attributed to Mr. Long; but some persons give it to a Mr. Hunter, a relation of Lord Mulgrave's. For my own part, I believe it to be Mr. Long's; but, this is a matter of little consequence, seeing that it is next to impossible, that it should have been written, without the consent, and even without the aid, of Mr. Pitt.——Here, then, these two gentlemen are fairly before the public: Mr. Addington the accuser of Mr. Pitt, who appears as the defender of himself, and, in his turn, the accuser of Mr. Addington. To assist the public in making a just decision between them is my principal object, in the course of this view, and to that I should solely have confined myself, had they not introduced other political characters, with respect to whom it will be necessary to make some few remarks.

The grounds of the attack, made by the Near Observer, "on Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Windham," are thus stated, by the Accurate Observer: "the time, the "manner, and the occasion, of their quitting their official situations; the promise "given and withdrawn, of 'constant, active, and zealous, support; the circumstances of the negotiation for the return "of Mr. Pitt to office; and the general "conduct of these persons in Parliament.'" But these grounds are not fairly stated. The Near Observer does, indeed, attack all three of these gentlemen on the ground of their quitting office, and on that of their parliamentary conduct since; but Lord Grenville is not implicated in the charge relative to the negotiation for Mr. Pitt's return to office, and Mr. Windham is included, neither in that charge, nor in the charge of having given a promise of "constant, active, and zealous support," or, of support of any kind. We shall, however, as we proceed, observe many instances, in which this more Accurate Observer is extremely anxious to place Mr. Pitt in company, wherever he finds that gentleman in circumstances which show him to the least advantage; and, to this anxiety alone must be ascribed his including under one head, the conduct in Parliament of Mr. Pitt, and that of Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham. A more fair, clear, and natural division of the subject would, I think, have been that which I here propose to pursue; to wit: I. The time, the manner, and the occasion, of the late ministry quitting their official situations. II. The promise, said to have been made by Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, to give to Mr. Addington their constant, active, and zealous support. III. The circumstances of the negotiation for the return of Mr. Pitt to office. IV. The conduct of the New Opposition in Parliament. V. Mr. Pitt's conduct in Parliament, since his retiring from office.

I. *The time, the manner, and the occasion, of the late ministry quitting their official situations.*

On this topic, the Near Observer states, that, at the time when the late ministry quitted hss Majesty's council, the nation was fatigued and discouraged by the length and events of the war, and was deserted by every useful ally; that France had subdued the whole of the Continent of Europe, except Austria, Prussia, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, the three latter of which powers were arming against our maritime rights, and calling on us to wage a new war, while the attitude of our old enemy became every day more formidable to us, even upon our own shores; that the artifices of party, and the unhappy success of so many expensive expeditions had entirely indisposed the country towards offensive operations, and that the mistakes and misfortunes in several instances, but particular in that of the annulling of the treaty of El-Arich had caused the highest distrust and dissatisfaction as to the conduct of the war, and the capacity of the persons entrusted with it; that an expedition was, indeed, prepared for retrieving our error in Egypt, and a fleet to assist our negotiations with the Northern Powers, but that no ministers could have been sanguine enough to expect their success, because that a British fleet had once before been sent to Copenhagen to *embolden* Lord Whitworth to sign a treaty of adjournment, at the expense of some implied and virtual concessions, which, in happier times, could never have been extorted from a British Cabinet, and because, as to Egypt, though it pleased Providence to bless his Majesty's arms with glorious success, it is impossible to deny the total incompetency of that expedition to its object, or to think that it deserved, or could have been crowned with victory according to human computation and probability. "In this complicated predicament," says he, "of evil and despondency, with every part "of Europe hostile to our interests, and "preparing to annoy us; without a distinct "end or remaining object in the war; our "expeditions hopeless; our enemy flushed "with insolence and success, and galled by "recent insult and repulse; what hope or "faint speculation of peace remained, what "part of our affairs appeared retrievable? "I appeal to the memory of all the country

" who am myself a witness of its situation " and despair!" On the indisposition of his Majesty the Near Observer dwells with peculiar emphasis, and expresses himself in language which one cannot help lamenting to see employed for a purpose such as that which he evidently has in view. " I throw " a veil," says he, " over the malady of " our beloved Sovereign, who never gave " pain to his subjects, but when they trembled for his life. But, the future historian of this eventful æra will make it his " care to dwell upon a calamity, which " heightened every terror in our circumstance, and more than redoubled every " other calamity. It was *at such a moment*, " that his Majesty's late ministers thought " proper to retire from his service!"—— The conclusion which he draws, or rather, which he says the world has drawn, from these assumed facts, is, that the late ministers, in resigning the reins of government, were actuated by " *despondency* and *apprehension*," and not by those considerations of duty and of honour, which, as they alledged, compelled them to resign, unless they could carry into effect the measure, which they had in view relative to the Catholics of Ireland, a conclusion which he, in several parts of his work, attempts to strengthen by insinuating, and sometimes asserting, that their resignation is, to this hour, " unaccounted for and unaccountable."

In his answer as to this point, the Accurate Observer begins by stating, that, as far as was consistent with their duty to their Sovereign, the late ministers did not hesitate to acquaint the public with the motives which had induced them to relinquish their situations: " Feeling," they said, " an in- " cumbent duty upon them to propose a " measure, on the part of government, " which they thought of great public im- " portance, and meeting with circumstances, " which rendered it impossible for them to " propose it, as a measure of government, " they felt it equally inconsistent with their " duty and their honour, any longer to re- " main a part of that government." This was the explanation, which, in substance, they gave repeatedly, both in and out of Parliament. Since, however, so much stress has been laid on the " *mysteriousness*" of the resignation, I think it right to insert here, at full length, the declarations, made, at the time, by Lords Grenville and Spencer, and by Mr. Pitt, the only persons, belonging to the late ministry, who, as far as I recollect, spoke in parliament upon the subject.

LORD GRENVILLE said: " A painful duty " yet remains for me to fulfil—to speak of " myself. From this I will not shrink, as " a due regard to my own character, as well " as becoming respect to your lordships, call " upon me to proceed. Some time ago, " my lords, the noble lord who now sits " near me, (Lord Spencer,) another noble " lord who is not now present, but whose " absence is only occasioned by severe in- " disposition (Lord Chatham), together with " myself, and several of his Majesty's ser- " vants in the House of Commons, thought " it expedient that the benefits of the union " should be rendered as great and as exten- " sive as possible, by certain disabilities being " removed, under which a great portion of " the inhabitants of Ireland now labour. " Imagining that this measure could alone " be effectual if coming from the executive " government, we felt it our duty to propose " it to those who direct his Majesty's coun- " cils. It was not deemed eligible, and we " were unable to prevail. Our opinion of " its policy remaining unaltered, still think- " ing that that, and that alone, could esta- " blish the tranquillity and prosperity of the " empire on a permanent basis, we consi- " dered ourselves as bound to retire. Ac- " cordingly, we tendered to his Majesty the " resignation of our several employments, " and he has been graciously pleased to dis- " pense with our services. Thus, my lords, " we only hold our offices till our successors " are appointed *."

" EARL SPENCER complained of the in- " vidious and unfair constructions put upon " the motives which had induced his noble " friend near him, himself, and others of his " Majesty's late ministers, to think that it " became them to resign their offices, and " to feel that they could no longer serve " their Sovereign and the State with advan- " tage to the country, and honour to them- " selves. They had fully explained that " they thought the fit opportunity offered " for taking a particular measure, likely es- " sentially to promote the combined interest " of the United Kingdom. They found " they could not be enabled to carry that " measure, and therefore they begged his " Majesty to accept their resignations. What " there was of mystery in this, or what was " believed, he was at a loss to imagine." †

" Mr. PITT begged the indulgence of the " House for a few words, as much of what " had been said seemed to be pointed per- " sonally at himself. He alluded to the in- " sinuations of an honourable gentleman " (Mr. Nicholls), respecting the Catholic

* Speech, 15th Feb. 1801.
† Speech, 20th March, 1801.

" question, which insinuations, he must as-
" sert, were wholly unfounded—on that
" point he earnestly wished not to be mis-
" understood. It was not very probable
" that he should have encouraged the pro-
" position of any rumours prejudicial to his
" Sovereign's fame, who through a long
" course of public life had uniformly expe-
" rienced the gracious regard and indul-
" gence of that Sovereign, for which he felt
" bound to him by every tie of duty, grati-
" tude, and affection.—The rumours, in-
" deed, which have been spread abroad, were
" so far founded, that it was upon account
" of the turn which the Catholic question
" took, the success of which he had con-
" ceived to be essentially necessary to the
" strength, prosperity, and unanimity of the
" United Kingdoms, that he felt himself
" bound, in conscience and in honour, to
" give in his resignation. This much he
" would not hesitate to explain as to the
" motive of his resignation; but he trusted
" it must be looked upon as a new doctrine
" to assert that a minister was obliged to
" assign every motive which might influence
" his resignation. He must venture to be-
" lieve that it never before was imputed as
" a crime to relinquish a high and honour-
" able situation, which it was the ambition
" of his life and the passion of his heart to
" continue to fill, as long as his exertions
" could contribute to the welfare of his
" country, because he felt that a further
" continuance in that situation had become
" incompatible with that conduct which the
" dictates of his honour and of his con-
" science prescribed. He would only add,
" that as to the merits of the Catholic ques-
" tion, and the propriety of the sentiments
" which he entertained respecting it, he
" would now say nothing more; he would
" rather leave the part he embraced in it to
" the more enlightened judgment of the
" country, and to the impartial decision of
" posterity. The early discussion and deci-
" sion of that question he thought were in-
" cumbent upon those who, under the cir-
" cumstances of the union, which they were
" so auspicious to effectuate, considered it
" as a measure of the utmost importance to
" the strength and tranquillity of the Em-
" pire. So strong was his conviction of the
" propriety and necessity of that measure,
" that he could not continue to remain a
" member of that government which deem-
" ed it inexpedient to entertain it. What-
" ever his future opinion and conduct should
" be respecting that question, when he no
" longer acted as part of administration, that
" opinion and conduct, should be regulated
" by what had uniformly guided the tenour
" of his public life; first to take a cool, deli-
" berate, and conscientious view of the sub-
" ject, and then adopt that decision which
" to him should appear best calculated to
" promote the strength, the unanimity, and
" the general welfare and prosperity of the
" empire."*

What further explanation was necessary? What further explanation could be asked, or given? The Accurate Observer, does, however, add, that the question, upon which the ministers resigned, took, in its course, a very different shape from that which it originally bore; and that, had a similar difference of opinion existed, with respect to any *other* question *attended by the same circumstances*, the result would, in all probability have been exactly the same. But, what shape the question took is of no importance here. The original cause of the resignation was the difference of opinion as to a measure relative to the Catholics of Ireland, and that cause was explained as amply, and, perhaps, more so, than the public had any right to expect. Indeed, who is there that recollects the publications of that day; who that recollects the controversy which was, for months, carried on, both in pamphlets and newspapers, upon the question on which the ministers resigned; who, when reminded of this controversy, can, without an abandonment of all pretensions to sincerity, affect to entertain a *doubt* as to the real cause of that resignation? What, then, must we think of the man, who, not only pretends to doubt on the subject, but who is indefatigable in his efforts to inculcate a belief, that the resignation arose from other, and most dishonourable motives? But, supposing, for a moment, that the Near Observer really entertained doubts, Mr. Addington could entertain none; he well knew, that he owed his elevation to his readiness to oppose the claims of the Catholics, and he well knows, that that is now the basis of his power: † what, therefore, shall be thought

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* Speech, 16th Feb. 1801.

† A history of the Irish rebellion, lately published under the patronage of government, contains, amongst other things, the expression of an opinion, that the measure, commonly called Catholic emancipation, ought to be adopted, and that it, or something like it, is absolutely necessary to the tranquillity of Ireland. It is confidently asserted, and I believe it to be true, that Mr. Addington, having discovered, that he has given the patronage of the ministry to a work, the principles of which are directly contrary to those of that ministry, has lately had the author before him, at the Treasury, and has accused him of deception, observing, that he, Mr. Addington, " came into power for the express purpose of " *preventing principles like those of the author from*

of him, who, under such circumstances, has lent his authority, the authority of his office, and the weight of government, for the purpose of circulating the hypocritical doubts, and base insinuations of the Near Observer?——Having stated the real cause of the resignation of the late ministers, it was unnecessary to say more upon the subject; but, the Accurate Observer has thought proper to show the absurdity of imputing to Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, motives of "despondency and "apprehension," and also, to contrast the reality with the false picture, which the Near Observer has drawn of the state of the country, in 1801. "What?" says he; "is it "probable, that ministers, who had seen "jacobin principles gaining daily strength "in Britain, Ireland in open rebellion, the "fleet in a state of mutiny, the bank supposed to be insolvent, the kingdom threatened with famine, and a people murmuring against the load of taxes, and the war "by which they were occasioned? Is it "probable that ministers, whom these evils "could not appal, should have yielded to "feelings of despair, and begun to be apprehensive of our danger, at the moment "when the malignant principles of jacobinism had been almost eradicated from the "country which gave them birth; when "they had accomplished a measure which "they considered as the best hope of the future tranquillity of Ireland; when our "fleets were triumphing in every part of "the world (and at that instant preparing a "dreadful stroke for a new foe); when "public credit was completely restored, and "the nation reconciled to the exertions, "which the state of Europe called for at "their hands."——To which he might have added, and, though last, certainly not least, 'when the price of provisions began to 'diminish, and when people were no longer 'apprehensive of famine.' In pursuing his remarks as to the *period* when the late ministers quitted their stations, he does not object to the accuracy of the statement, which his adversary has made as to the abject situation of the continent of Europe; but he very naturally expresses his surprise, that "a zea-"lous partizan of a ministry, who had given "their *sanction* to the subjugation of half of "the continent, and to the absorption of the "remainder in the enormous power of France, "should love to dwell on those unfortunate "events, and to adduce, as an instance "of the *desperate* situation of the country "under the late administration, a state of "things which the present 'successful, "'fortunate, vigorous, and prudent admi-"'nistration,' have solemnly ratified or "tacitly consented to!"——He denies that the war was become unpopular, and cites the Journals of Parliament in proof of its being less unpopular in 1801, than in 1795, 1796, and 1797.——As to the marks of incapacity in the persons intrusted with the conduct of the war, which marks, the Near Observer says, the public had discovered in the history of the treaty of El-Arich, and in the convention of adjournment, signed by Lord Whitworth at Copenhagen, the Accurate Observer, after giving the true history of the treaty of El-Arich,* proceeds: "but, if, indeed, the expedition "prepared for the recovery of Egypt was "incompetent to the object, if his Majes-"ty's *late* ministers have no claim to the "merit of 'that most happy and stupen-"'dous service,' I would ask, upon what "are founded the pretensions of the pre-"sent administration to it? Is it that the "principal battle which was fought in the "campaign, and which may be said to "have decided the fate of Egypt, took "place upon the very day that Mr. Ad-

"*behind* [illegible]; and that he *now holds his place* "*upon* [illegible]." ——If gentlemen cannot read themselves, they should employ somebody to read for them.

* On the 15th of December, 1799, the British government having reason to believe, that proposals would be made for the evacuation of Egypt by the French troops, upon condition of being suffered to return unmolested to France, sent instructions to Lord Keith not to consent to any such convention. The bad faith with which such engagements had been kept by the French government, and the danger which would arise at that particular period, from the return to Europe of so large a force, appear to be the motives which governed the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, in giving those orders. As soon as they learnt that, before the receipt of these orders, Sir Sidney Smith had concluded a convention, upon the terms of the return of the French troops to their own country, although without any stipulation to prevent their serving immediately in Europe, the British government sent orders to the Admiral not to obstruct the execution of this treaty.——Before these second orders reached Lord Keith, he had, according to his instructions, notified his former orders to the French General, the consequence of which was, the immediate renewal of hostilities. What then is meant by the violation of the treaty of El-Arisch? the whole responsibility to which the late ministers are subjected by this transaction, depends upon the policy of giving the orders of 15th of December, 1799. In discussing this question we must remember, that at this time the chief hope of the war rested upon the events of the continental campaign, which, in the quarter that would in all probability have been principally affected by the return of the French troops, was terminated in favour of the enemy, by a hard fought battle, and which, at one period, was even considered as gained by our allies.

" dington became the First Lord of the " Treasury? or that Lord Hobart opened " the dispatches addressed to Mr. Dundas, " giving an account of that glorious event?" ——The treaty of adjournment, as it is called by the Near Observer, is thus defended by his adversary: " By the Preli- " minary Convention of the 29th of Aug. " 1800, it was stipulated, that his Danish " Majesty should *suspend his convoys*, until " the conclusion of a definitive treaty. If, " therefore, there was any extortion in this " transaction, it consisted in our obliging " our adversary, as a preliminary, to give " up the object in dispute, until we should " be enabled, with greater means in our " hands, to treat with him for the final " acquiescence in our demands." And, as to the inadequacy of the expedition under Admiral Parker, " the circumstance of its " object being accomplished, with respect " to one power, at the very sight of the " British fleet, and to another, by the ope- " rations of a *detachment* from it, is not very " favourable to the opinion that our author " thinks it 'were unjust to dissemble.'" ——Here the Accurate Observer is triumphant, and here, as a friend and defender of Mr. Pitt, he should certainly have stopped; but, not content with ascribing the victory of Copenhagen, the victory, by which, to borrow the words of his opponent, " the " rostral column of our naval enterprize " had been crowned;" not content with giving this great and deserved merit to the expedition, he unfortunately adds, that it " led to the convention, upon which the " present ministers rest so much of their " claim to applause;" but, says he, " whe- " ther, by this convention they obtained " for the country all that we had a right " to expect, is a question upon which *great* " *difference of opinion exists*, but which it is " now unnecessary to discuss." ——Between those who think that our maritime rights, as formerly enjoyed, were not worth preserving, and those who think they were, great difference of opinion, as to this question, does certainly exist; but, though this difference exists between Lords Grenville and Hawkesbury, there is no such difference between Mr. Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury; for, as the advocate of the right honourable gentleman ought to have well remembered, Mr. Pitt gave to the convention of St Petersburgh, an approbation as unequivocal and as strong as words could possibly express. " I shall not now," said he, " enter " at large on the subject of the pacification " with the Northern Powers, nor on that " of the preliminaries of peace with France; " but they both have my *cordial approba-* " *tion*. I behold them with the most *ex-* " *alted satisfaction*; and, to whatever infe- " rior criticisms either of them may be " liable, I think, that, on the whole, they " afford matter of great *joy and exultation* " to the country, and entitle the govern- " ment to its warmest approbation and *most* " *grateful thanks*." This declaration, which was made in Parliament, on the 29th of October, 1801, for ever closes the lips of Mr. Pitt with respect to the convention with the Northern Powers; and, therefore, the insinuation thrown out, on this subject, by his defender, is not much less unfair than any of the numerous arts resorted to by his assailant. ——The last point to be considered under this head, is, the charge against the late ministers for resigning their offices at the time of his Majesty's illness. On this circumstance the Near Observer dwells with peculiar delight and self gratulation. At " such a moment," says he, after describing his Majesty as " indisposed and " incapable of administering the affairs of " his government;" at " *such a moment*, " his Majesty's late ministers thought pro- " per to retire from his service." In answer to which the Accurate Observer states the well-known fact, that " the ministers " laid their offices at his Majesty's feet, " days and weeks *previous* to this most " alarming and distressing event." Indeed, there is no person, at all acquainted with the circumstances of the resignation, who must not well remember this fact; and, therefore, the Near Observer could have had in view to deceive the ignorant only. The basest of all calumny is that which relies for its success on the vices or the ignorance of those on whom it is intended to operate. ——In this part of the discussion the Accurate Observer introduces a fact, with which I was before totally unacquainted, and which, I think, he would have done well to keep out of sight. By stating the simple truth, as to the *time* when the late ministers tendered their resignations, he had fully convicted his adversary of falsehood; of a gross ignorance of facts, or of wilful and base calumny; but, his zeal for Mr. Pitt would not suffer him to stop here, leaving that gentleman merely defended from the charge preferred against him, in that respect, upon no more than *a footing* with his late colleagues. This was not sufficient for the Accurate Observer, who uniformly seeks to confound Mr. Pitt with those colleagues, when his defence is weak, and to separate him from them, when he imagines it strong, or when he has any

great virtue or the merit of any great measure to bestow. In yielding to this propensity, he has, in the present instance, endeavoured, with much more zeal than judgment, to give to the Right Hon. Gent. a trait of magnanimity not observable in the conduct of his colleagues. He says: "But, "my observation, which is not very dis- "tant, has deceived me much, if Mr. Pitt, "*at the time of doing so*" [the time when he first tendered his resignation] "did not "make a distant offer, to retain *his* situa- "tion, until the war should be concluded, "and the country relieved from its most "pressing difficulties."——This is strange, very strange, indeed! Strange, in any light, but particularly strange as a trait of *magnanimity!* The *end of the war,* indeed, was something definitive, but, till the country should be "*relieved from its most pressing difficulties,*" was no period at all, it was what would never have an end. The question, then, comes: what reason was there that could induce Mr. Pitt to remain alone, which would not also have induced his colleagues to remain? If they and he retired, because they were bound "in *honour* and in *duty*" so to do, when they could not propose the measure of Catholic Emancipation, how could he alone have remained, consistently with that honour and that duty? But, his advocate tells us, that to *his* remaining was attached the condition, "that no attempt should be made, in "the mean time, to prejudge the important "question, the difference on which had led "to his resignation." This is a very poor paliative; for, if the question could be adjourned, till after the end of the war, or till the farther indefinite period, when the country should be relieved from its most pressing difficulties; if the "important question" could be thus adjourned *sine die,* where are we to look for the "honour and duty," which *compelled* Mr. Pitt to resign, because the King would not allow him to propose that important question to Parliament? Besides, if we allow, that the *condition,* on which Mr. Pitt was willing to remain in office, would have saved *his* consistency, if we allow that *he* would thereby have obeyed the dictates of honour and of duty, the same reasoning will, most assuredly, apply to all his colleagues; and, why did he not, then, propose, that, upon the same condition, the *whole* of them should remain in office? Such a proposal would, indeed, have reduced the late ministry to the situation of first giving in their resignations, because they could not bring forward a question which honour and duty impelled them to bring forward, and then of re-accepting their offices, upon condition that that very same question should *not* be brought forward, till the end of the war, or till the country should be relieved from its most pressing difficulties! From this situation, exquisitely inconsistent and ridiculous as it would have been, Mr. Pitt was, it seems, preserved, by his offer "not being accepted;" and, it is truly surprizing, that a pamphlet, written under his own eye,* should have made the confession of his having been thus preserved *against his will.*

(To be continued.)

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AFFAIRS OF IRELAND.

Under this head, the object that first attracts our attention is the bill, which has just been passed, for continuing *martial law* in Ireland. When the ministers told parliament, in the speech from the throne, that they indulged "a hope that such of the de- "luded people of that country as had "swerved from their allegiance, were now "convinced of their error," and were not only so convinced, but were ready "*cordial-* "*ly* and *zealously* to concur in resisting any "attempt of the enemy;" when they further said, that the "leaders in the late "traitorous and atrocious conspiracy had "been *brought to justice,* and that public tran- "quillity had experienced *no further interrup-* "*tion;*" when these consoling tidings were communicated to the nation, who would have imagined, that these same ministers had, at that very moment, prepared an act, which in its preamble states "the spirit of "*rebellion* and insurrection to be now ac- "tually *raging* in Ireland?" Who would have imagined this? Yet such is the fact.—As to the justice and policy of rendering the people of Ireland liable to the operation of martial law, without instituting any inquiry respecting the *necessity* of so severe a measure, a measure, in virtue of which the law of the land may, at any moment, be set aside, and leave every man to the risk of being tried by a court-martial, consisting of seven officers, from the decision of which court there is no appeal, this is a question much too extensive in its branches, and far too important, to admit of being discussed in the time and the space, to which I am here confined. In a future sheet, it shall be taken up, in its full extent; but, at pre-

* Since the former pages of this View were written, I have received what I regard as satisfactory *proof* of Mr. Long being the author of this pamphlet.

sent, I shall confine myself to a remark or two on the conduct of the Irish administration, at the time of the rebellion, which first gave rise to the measure of martial law, and on that part of their conduct in particular, which relates to the late Commander in Chief of the forces.——The public will recollect, that, I some time ago stated, that, on the morning of the 23d of July, the very day that the rebellion broke out in Dublin, a general order was issued, by the Commander in Chief, General Fox, directing that ten men of each company should be permitted to go on furlough, for the purpose of assisting to get in the harvest. To have issued such an order, *after* having been duly informed of the threatened rebellion, would have been an act very little short of treason, as it would have been to disband, for the time, one *sixth* part of the effective force, at least. On a former occasion (p. 288), I said one *fourth* part; but I was not then aware of the augmentation, which has, of late years, been made in the strength of the companies. In p. 414, it was observed, that, from the information then received, it appeared, that General Fox was *not* duly apprized of the state of the country: "Some *sacrifice*, however," it was then said, "is wanted; *somebody* must "be to blame, and, it appears General Fox "is to be the Jonas. How he will sustain "that character remains to be seen; but, "the world will certainly be very much "surprised, if he should tamely suffer his "reputation, either as a loyal subject or as "a military man, to be tarnished for the "sake of any douceur that the Addingtons "and Hawkesburies have to bestow *."—It is with some satisfaction that I now turn back to this passage. The conjecture was correct in all its parts: Gen. Fox has, as far as the ministry could effect their purpose, been made the Jonas; the douceur has been tendered to him; but he has not, for the sake thereof, suffered his reputation to be tarnished; a parliamentary inquiry into his conduct, as well as that of the Irish administration, is to be moved for, immediately after the recess; and, if that inquiry should be resisted by ministers, the nation will not be at a loss where to fix the guilt.——Mr. Fox, in speaking on this subject in parliament, on the 9th instant, referred to and quoted, a paragraph, published in a Dublin paper, just after the event of the 23d of July, in the following words: "Our Com-"mander in Chief is a brother to Mr. Fox "of the House of Commons, and first cou-"sin to the Duke of Leinster, and the late "*Lord Edward Fitzgerald.*" The insinuation, and the inference to be drawn from it, are too evident to be pointed out; and, a more base or infamous attempt to destroy the reputation of any man, never was known, or heard of, in the world. Far be it from me to say, or to think, that such a paragraph as this was inserted by, or with the connivance of, any persons high in office in Ireland. That, I hope, and sincerely believe, is an act, of which none of those persons are capable; but, in a city, where the press, the *whole* of the political periodical press, is at the *absolute command* of the government, it is not going too far to say, that those, who did insert, or cause to be inserted, this paragraph, were fully persuaded, that it would not be read with displeasure at the Castle; and, when, joined to this circumstance, it is acknowledged, as it now is, that the Lord Lieutenant wished for General Fox to be recalled, it is impossible that the latter can rest satisfied with any thing short of a full examination into the conduct of both.——The partisans of ministry are, in the mean time, using their utmost endeavours to prepossess the public mind against General Fox, whom, not being able to make any specific charge, they represent, in general terms, as being a slothful, negligent person; and, accordingly, leave their hearers to conclude, that the rebellion, together with all its consequences, would have been prevented by a Commander in Chief of a different character. Nothing is so foul as this mode of attack, and in it no men or set of men were ever so successful as the present ministry. They deal largely enough in the press; they care not who they employ in that way, nor how they prostitute the offices, either in *Church* or State, as rewards for the services that are rendered them. But, the press they dare not, in all cases, have recourse to; then they avail themselves of verbal slander; and, it is really astonishing how swift and how wide the effects of this political back-biting are extended. This is the way, in which their partizans are now attacking General Fox. They are sinking the facts of the rebellion, and are endeavouring to give the whole event an appearance of having arisen out of his general habits of slothfulness and neglect. Seeing that such is their object, I shall, I trust, be excused, for stating what I myself have heard, and what I have *known*, of the character and conduct of General Fox, as a military man. I can only say, on this subject, what is well known to the British army;

* See Register, Vol. IV. p. 414. Sep. 17, 1803.

but in foreign courts and countries, where this dispute will not fail to excite considerable interest, my statement may be of some use.——I was once under the command of General Fox, he being commanding officer of the garrison, where the 38th regiment, of which he was then Lieutenant Colonel, at that time, lay. I have, before and since that time, been with more than forty of our regiments of foot; and, except in the single instance of his Royal Highness the Duke of Kent, I never saw so active and vigilant a field officer as General Fox. Since the epoch, to which I here allude, I have passed several years of my life amongst men, who had served immediately under General Fox, during the greater part of the war in America, where he had a conspicuous command in the flying army, and to which army he would never have been appointed, had he not been distinguished for qualities exactly the contrary of those, which are now, most falsely, I am persuaded, attributed to him. All those whom I have known, who served under him at that time; all the military men I ever heard speak of him, have uniformly given him the character of *extraordinary* activity, vigilance, punctuality, and zeal for the service; and this account perfectly corresponded with what I myself have seen of him. This knowledge of the character of General Fox emboldened me, the moment I heard any blame imputed to him, to state, that "he "had always been considered a very zea- "lous and vigilant officer, and that, in the "present instance, there was every reason "to believe, no part of the blame would "be found to attach to him;" a statement, which, it now appears, was perfectly correct.—— But, indeed, the best and most complete reply to this ministerial backbiting is to be found in the commands, with which these ministers themselves have entrusted General Fox. If he had been, at the time of his appointment to Ireland, or if he were now, the man which they wish the world to regard him; if he had been an indolent, slothful, negligent man, where are we to look for a justification for their conduct in having appointed him, at such a time, to the chief command of the forces in Ireland? And, if his conduct in Ireland has discovered to them the qualities they now impute to him; if, in short, he has *misbehaved* in Ireland; if, owing to his misbehaviour, or his inability, the city of Dublin has been surprised, is it wise, is it proper, is it decent, to commit to his generalship the immensely greater metropolis of England, including the palace, the family, and the sacred person of the King?——Let the partizans of ministers, or let the ministers themselves, answer these questions, if they can.

The Volunteer-System.

Since the meeting of Parliament, this system, which was before falling into disrepute, has experienced a considerable depreciation, notwithstanding the support, which it has received from that able financier, Mr. Pitt. He wished to render it more efficient; but, the very proposition which he made for that purpose, proved that his wish was impracticable; because the efficiency was not to be obtained without such means as could not be had, or could not be employed. His proposition, however, amounted to a full acknowledgment of the *present* inefficiency of the system. Thus far, he has proved the advesaries of the system to be right; and, it surely is not too much to ask of him, to be, in future, less pertinacious, upon this topic in particular, than he has heretofore been. He tells us, that, if we will adopt certain regulations, the system will be good; but, having before told us, that it would be good without those regulations, how can he expect that we *now* should place in his assurances an implicit belief.——How grievously has this gentleman disappointed his friends! How has he disappointed the nation! Instead of going into those grand subjects, the military and naval means and resources of the country, and the conduct of ministers relative thereto, he shuts his eyes to the past, and to the future also, except as far as relates to some trifling matters of detail, and that detail, too, of a sort that could, one would think, have seriously occupied no mind but that of some grocer or cheesemonger, puffed up with the vanity of being a colonel of volunteers. Was this the line of conduct which the nation expected to see pursued by Mr. Pitt? ——Mr. Fox's speech, on this occasion, contained some most excellent remarks. He truly described the vaunted system of volunteer-corps; he set at nought that mean, that worthless, that shop-keeping popularity, which Mr. Pitt still seemed to cling to; and, in short, his whole speech, even leaving the *magnanimity* of it out of the question, was well worthy of the applause, with which it was received.—— It was hoped, that Mr. Pitt's disposition, also, to bury all party animosities, and to form, in this critical juncture, an union of all the great character and talents in the country, would have appeared, from his conduct, at the opening of the Parliament; and, though

this hope does seem to have been disappointed, it ought not to be entirely relinquished, till we have seen the part which the right honourable gentleman will take on the important questions relative to Ireland.—*Unanimity*; to see a cordial unanimity amongst the *great men* of the day must be the wish of every one, who loves his king and country; for, such an unanimity is the only means of producing those great and wise measures, by which alone we can hope to recover our lost reputation, and to preserve ourselves from slavery. We are daily and hourly fading in the eyes of the world: foreign nations speculate upon our fall: the probable *fall of England* is a subject that is become familiar in their mercantile transactions. A striking and most woeful instance of this is now exhibited in our commercial concerns with the United States of America, where the merchants *refuse* to draw bills of exchange on England and to guarantee payment *in case an invasion of the country shall have taken place!* I speak of a fact here, which I call upon the partisans of ministers to deny, if they can; and, in order to render the denial more specific, I will refer to both time and place. I say, then, that at Philadelphia and New York, on the 5th of November last, no bill of exchange on England was to be bought, without the insertion of a condition, that, in case England should be invaded, when the bill arrived, the drawer of the said bill should not be liable to damages. The consequence of which was, few people would purchase bills, and the consequence of that was, remittances were delayed, unless dollars could be collected and transmitted, at the loss of freight and insurance; and such was the demand for dollars, from this cause, that, at the time referred to, the bank at Philadelphia put a stop to, or, at least, limited, its issues in specie.—Such, as to America, are the consequences, and the natural consequences of a want of confidence *in the stability of our government*; for it is nothing short of that: and, that this want of confidence has, in great part, arisen from the contemptuous opinion, which the Americans, in common with all other foreigners, entertain of our ministry, no one will, I imagine, attempt to deny, especially if he has read the public prints of the United States, from one end to the other of which, those ministers are spoken of in terms, which no Englishman, though the opponent of ministers, can possibly hear without sorrow and shame, nor even without some degree of resentment.—Are we to be told, that this distrust, on the part of the Americans is merely the effect of Buonaparté's threats of invasion? Why was not this effect produced *last* war, when an invasion of Ireland actually took place? Lord Hawkesbury said, no longer ago than the 10th of August last, that the *dangers of the country were greater in* 1798 *than in the time when he was speaking*; but, did the Americans refuse to guarantee bills in 1798? No such thing ever entered into their minds. During the whole of 1798 bills on England were regarded as good as at any former period; and, in short, during the whole of last war there was no merchant in America, who did not look upon England as the securest place in the whole world, his own country not excepted. To what, then, are we to attribute that want of confidence, which exists with respect to our country? To what but an universal contempt of the ministers, by whom that country is governed?—From this long and rambling digression, I should now return to the subject of Volunteer Corps, and offer a few observations on their *exemptions* and *committees*; but, want of room will compel me to postpone these topics to my next; in the mean time, however, I think it necessary to state, that I shall most amply prove the falsehood of an assertion which has been made, that the *committee* mentioned by Mr. Windham is a *solitary* instance, *six-sevenths*, at least, of the infantry corps being under the guidance of such committees, though the important and alarming fact was, it seems, utterly unknown to Mr. Pitt, the generalissimo of the shop-keeping army. I will once more, and for the last time, observe, on the baseness of accusing me, and those who think with me, on this subject, of despising the *volunteers*. It is the *system*, and not the men. To despise or hate the volunteers would, agreeably to a sentiment very happily expressed by a writer in the Morning Chronicle, be to despise or hate my country. And, is this my character? Have I ever despised, have I ever hated, have I ever turned my back upon, my county or my countrymen? And have I ever refused to face their enemies? But, of these base arts of my opponents, I will take no more notice; for, of those who are so ignorant as to be misled by them, the good opinion is not worth possessing.—In referring to the attacks on the volunteer system, I should naturally enquire, what prevented Mr. *Sheridan* from stepping forward in its defence; Mr. Sheridan, who moved the vote of thanks, and who is said to have been rewarded by a colonelcy; but this enquiry also must be delayed till my next.

ARMY ESTIMATES.] —Mr. Addington

said, some time ago, that, "even certain "success in reducing the power of France "would not have been worth *forty millions* "*of money*." What may be the object, which that great man has, at present, in view, is, as far as I know, a profound secret. From what has been let out, one would believe, the object to be nothing more than an attempt, and a very humble attempt too, to eke out the existence of Britain, as an independent nation. If *reducing the power of France* was not worth *forty millions*, the object here supposed to be in view, cannot, surely, be worth nearly so much; yet, I think, it will be very wonderful indeed, if it does not cost the full sum, during the very first year of the war, the expenses of which Mr. Addington estimates at twenty-six millions, but which will not fall short of forty-two or forty-three millions. It is, indeed, impossible, as yet, to make out a statement worthy of any other name than that of *a guess*; but, it is my opinion, that the expenses of the army, ordnance, and navy, for the first *whole* year of war, will be, for Great-Britain alone, nearly as follows:—

	£.
Salaries of the army as stated by the Secretary at War, exclusive of Barracks	8,346,860
Barracks	1,500,000
Extraordinary Services	5,500,000
Bounties to 40,000 Army of Reserve at 40l. per man	1,600,000
Expenses of 397,000 Volunteers, at 7 l. per man, *loss of labour not included*, ..	2,779,000
Army	19,725,860
Ordnance	4,000,000
Navy	17,303,371
	41,039,231
War portion of Miscellanies	1,500,000
Total	42,539,231

THE REVENUE.

In the speech from the throne, the minister thought proper to tell the House of Commons, that there was a "progressive im-"provement of the revenue," which could not fail to encourage them to persevere in the present system of finance; and, the House of Commons, in their response to this part of the speech, assure his Majesty, that they are fully sensible of the advantages of this system. From assurances like these, who would not believe, that the revenue has been *more productive* this year than it was last year? Most assuredly this is the notion intended to be conveyed to the public; yet, it will be no difficult matter to show, that the contrary is the fact, notwithstanding the comparative account of the produce of the permanent taxes, which has lately been laid before parliament, and which has been made the ground of exultation amongst the partizans of the ministry.——The paper, here referred to, purports to be an account of the net produce of all the permanent taxes in the years and quarters ending the 10th day of October 1802 and 1803, respectively; and, its object is to show, that the year ending the 10th of October, 1803, has been more productive than the year ending 10th Oct. 1802. The war taxes, that is to say, the taxes imposed and collected during this present year, are left out of course; but the produce of the addition made to the customs, under the pretext of consolidation, is included in the receipt of the present year. The totals of this comparative account stand thus.

Year ending 10th Oct. 1803...	£30,192,335
Year ending 10th Oct. 1802...	25,199,093
Difference	£ 4,993,242

Now, who would not imagine, that this sum of difference exhibited the degree of that "improvement of the revenue," alluded to in the King's speech, and so much talked of out of doors? Who would imagine, that, as to the improvement of the revenue, as to the proof of national prosperity, contained in this account, the decision is against the present year, instead of being in favour of it? Strange as these suppositions may be, such, nevertheless, is the fact.——In the year 1802, there were *new* taxes imposed to the annual estimated amount of £4,785,123. As these taxes were not enacted till the month of May, they yielded, in the year ending 10th October, 1802, only £986,570; and, of course, there has been, from these new taxes, the sum of £3,798,553 received in the year ending 10th October, 1803, *more* than there was received from that source in the year ending 10th October, 1802.——Again: last winter, an act was passed to *consolidate* the custom duties, and, by means of this act of consolidation as it is called, an *addition* was made to those duties, which addition has, in the year ending 10th October, 1803, produced £62,500.— A third cause of difference is to be found in the account of corn bounties, that is to say, sums paid by way of bounty for the importation of corn and rice, which sums being paid at the Custom-house, where they are first deducted from the gross receipt at that House, are, of course, never brought into the Exchequer, and are not included in the accounts of the net produce of the taxes, laid before the House of Commons. During the year ending 10th October, 1802, there was, on this account, deducted from the net produce of

the permanent taxes £1,633,587; but, in the year ending 10th October, 1803, there was, on the same account, not one farthing deducted from the net produce of those taxes. The three sums here specified, must, then, in a comparative view of the two years, be deducted from the produce of the year ending 10th October, 1803; and, when this is done, it will be found, that the "improvement of "the revenue," which has been so much boasted of by the partizans of the minister, turns out to be a *decline* in its produce.

	£.	£.
Net produce of permanent taxes in year ending 10th Oct. 1803.....		30,192,335
New taxes not received in 1803, more than in 1802.	3,798,553	
Arising from addition made to Customs in 1803.....	62,500	
Corn bounties paid out of taxes in 1802, none being paid in 1803.....	1,633,587	
		5,494,640
		£.24,697,695
Net produce of permanent taxes in the year ending 10th Oct. 1802....		25,199,093
Net produce of permanent tax 10th Oct. 1803, deducting for new taxes and corn bounties, as above.....		24,697,695
Difference, being a falling off in the revenue during the year ending 10th Oct. 1803.		
		£ 501,398

Here is a defalcation of half a million instead of a "progressive improvement;" for, certainly, no one will pretend that the having made an addition to the receipt, by the means of *new* taxes, is a mark of "improve-"ment?" If it be, there is no denying, that we are under a course of improvement, such as no nation upon earth ever before experienced. If this be improvement, the more numerous and the heavier are the burdens of the people, the more they ought to rejoice, for the greater, in that case, would be the means, and, of course, the credit of the nation! But, this is not the way to make a comparison between the produce of two years of taxes; this is not the way to make out a case of improvement. Such comparison, to be of any use for such a purpose, must be confined to taxes which were in existence, and in full operation at, or before, the commencement of the first of the two years, the produce of which is compared; for, whatever sum may have been collected from new taxes, if there is a falling off upon those which have existed *during both the years*, that falling off must, according to its magnitude, be regarded as a mark of decline in the pecuniary prosperity of the nation. But there is another consideration, with which people seem to trouble themselves but very little, but which is of vast importance in every estimate of national receipt or expenditure, particularly in comparative estimates; and that is the gradual *depreciation of money*. If the national receipt amounts to the same sum this year as it amounted to last year, people generally suppose, that it will purchase as much service for the state; and, if there were no paper currency, and, of course, very little depreciation of money, this supposition would never be very distant from the truth; but far different is the state in which we are, and in which we see the value of money lessen even during the short space that it remains in our hands. Upon a computation leaning rather in favour of the value of money, it appears, that since the year 1797, that is, since the *restriction*, as it is called, was enacted as to the issues of specie at the bank, the average *annual depreciation* of money has been at the rate of four-pence in the pound; and, therefore, unless we suppose the depreciation to have been, this year, *less* than usual, the sum of 30,000,000l. of money collected in taxes up to the 10th of October last, is not worth more, and, in fact, *is* not more, than that of 29,500,000l. collected last year; so that, adding this half million to the half million of real deficit in the receipts, it appears, that the "improvement in the revenue" consists of a defalcation of a million.—— Let us now see how the surplus of the consolidated fund is likely to stand at the end of the present year; first adverting to the promises held out by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 10th of December, 1802, when he estimated the surplus of the consolidated fund, for the present year, at 7,845,000 l.; but "though he saw no reason to apprehend "a diminution of any part of the revenue, "he would not reckon upon a sum so large "as might have been inferred from the "experience of the three last quarters, and "he had, therefore, limited his expecta-"tions to 6,500,000l." These words are quoted from his speech as published by himself, in the shape of a pamphlet; but the whole speech will be found, very correctly given, in the Register, Vol. II. p. 910 *et seq.*——It will be remembered, that this estimate was, at the time of its being made, declared to be fallacious. On every point of his financial statements Mr. Addington was contradicted; but, as to the surplus of the consolidated fund in particular, he was brought to issue with his opponents. The

month of January next will decide the question. In the mean time, however, it is proper to shew what that decision is likely to be.——We have already seen, that the income up to October, exclusive of the sum derived from the new taxes imposed since the estimate was made, that is to say, the war taxes, amounted to 30,129 835 l. This was the produce of four quarters up to the 10th of October last; and, if we suppose that the present quarter, including arrears, will amount to as much as the last quarter, we certainly are far from under-rating its produce. The charge upon this income, or fund, will be, for the present year, *excluding* expenses incurred by new loan, and excluding also interest on Imperial loan, together with some other charges, 25,590,864 l., * which sum being deducted from the income, leaves a *surplus* of 4,538,971 l., instead of 7,845,000 l., at which it was estimated by Mr. Addington, or at least, instead of 6,500,000 l., which he *relied* on, and which he actually included in his ways and means for the year.† A short time will now fully discover who has been correct, and who incorrect, as to this subject. The hasty remarks here made will, at any rate, serve to awaken attention, amongst some few persons, and, as far as they have that effect, will guard against that despondency, which a financial deficit, suddenly announced, is apt to create in this money-loving community, especially at a time when there appears to be less hope than ever of seeing an end to the

RESTRICTION ON THE BANK.—On this subject, so closely connected with every rational view that can be taken of our ability to continue the war for any length of time, some observations were offered to the public in a preceding sheet. But, it was not then remarked, that, the paying, or not paying, in specie, at the Bank of England, is, by our enemy, if not by the world at large, considered as the proof of whether we are able, or unable, to carry on the present war, to an extended period, without utter ruin to our national credit, or, in other words, without a national bankruptcy. The late Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Rose, in his "Brief Examination of the Finances," observes, when speaking of the income tax, which had just then, in 1799, been imposed, that, amongst other great advantages arising from the resolution to levy a considerable portion of the taxes within the year, would be, "to convince our enemies, and to "inform all Europe, that, if France built "hopes on the expected overthrow of our "financial system, and trusted to the failure "of our resources, that those hopes were "vain." ‡ Lord Auckland, upon the same occasion said;—"such, then, my lords, is "the plan before us; establishing a sys-"tem of supply essentially important in the "present struggle, essentially beneficial on "the eventual *return of peace*, and such as "will hereafter induce all nations to *pause*, "before they bring upon us the necessity of "engaging in a new war with them." § France has not "*paused*" long. How delusive, alas! have been all, yes *all*, the promises of the English financiers for twenty years past! And, how obstinately blind, how incorrigible, have been the people! The *people?* But, indeed, the people, properly so called; the people of Britain, know nothing of the matter.—Returning to the subject more directly in view, we find Mr. Addington, in proposing *his* income tax, his plan for "raising a great part of the supplies within the year;" we find him, too, holding out to us, as one of its most beneficial effects, "that of convincing the enemy "of this country, that it is *hopeless* for him "to contend with our finances, and of con-"vincing the other powers of Europe, that "they may safely join with us, in a com-"mon cause, for that the resources of this "country are such as to give full security for "the punctual discharge of any engage-"ments it may enter into." ‖ It is truly surprising that these financiers should, at periods so distant, repeat each others sentiments and words so exactly. But to all this boasting, all this grand display of "inex-"haustible resources," Buonaparté laconically replies: "*pay your bank-notes in gold* "*and silver*, and then we will believe you, "without your going to war, and without "your adding twelve millions annually to "your taxes." ¶ The stoppage of cash payments, therefore, which the blind partisans of Ministers would fain have us regard as a thing of no consequence, is, in the opinion of our enemy, the criterion of our pecuniary means. Nor, can there be any doubt, that it is so in the opinion of the world; and as all credit depends entirely upon opinion, that which the world thinks, relative to our credit, really exists.—On the 13th instant, a debate took place in the House of Lords, on the third reading of the Bank Restriction

* See account of consolidated fund for the year ending the 5th January, 1803. Political Register, Vol. III. p. 609.

† See Vol. II. p. 910, et seq.

* Rose's Brief Examination, 5th Edit. p. 75.

† Lord Auckland's Speech, 8th Jan. 1799, pamphlet copy, p. 30.

‡ See his speech, 13th June, 1803. Vol. II. p. 906.

§ Moniteur of 17th of June, 1803.

Bill. Some remarks, well worthy of public attention, were made by the Lords Grenville and King, and by his Grace the Duke of Norfolk. Lord Hawkesbury replied to some of those remarks. The conversation, for such it was rather than a debate, was interesting; and the apathy of the nation as to the subject was tolerably well pourtrayed in the number of peers present, which amounted only to *fourteen!*——Lord Grenville dwelt much upon the vast increase of *private paper*, and apprehended the worst consequences from the further increase of it, because he said, being payable *in specie*, it was likely to obtain a preference to the bank paper. But, this notion seems to be erroneous, because all private paper is payable in bank paper, at best, seeing that, of whatever sort the private paper may be, it can never be more than the evidence of a debt, and for no debt can a man be arrested, provided he tender bank paper to the amount of it. His lordship thought, that a joint committee of the two houses of parliament, or a committee of each house, ought, as soon after the recess as convenient, to be appointed to examine into and report upon, the state of the bank, and of the currency of the country; and, he also wished to see some measure prepared, for supporting, in case of invasion, the credit of the private paper of the part of the country, in which the invasion might take place.—Lord Hawkesbury having observed, that he *doubted* of the increase of paper, since the first act of restriction on the bank, Lord King produced the accounts to shew, that the bank paper had nearly doubled since that time, whereupon Lord Hawkesbury said, that he did not mean the bank paper, but the *private paper!* Every man at all conversant with the subject knows, that, as Lord Grenville stated, since the first act of restriction, the private paper has increased *more* than the bank of England paper. Driven from this, Lord Hawkesbury seemed to contend, that the increase of paper was owing to the increase of "*trade, capital*, and *national prosperity*;" and, if his lordship's position be true, the progress of the increase of paper must be peculiarly encouraging to the people. The bank of England notes in circulation,

In August, 1797 amounted to	£10,828,880
— August, 1798	12,115,640
— August, 1799	13,759,940
— August, 1800	15,230,410
— January, 1801	16,365,206
— June, .. 1802	16,747,300
— February, 1803	16,108,560
— June 1st	16,101,140
— August 1st,	16,734,510
— October 1st	16,622,510
— November 25th	17,931,930

What a cheering prospect! According to Lord Hawkesbury's doctrine, our trade, capital and national prosperity, have been almost doubled in the space of six years! This is the sort of accounts, this is the financial view, to send to the different courts of Europe! Prosperity doubled in the short space of six years! Break your heart, Buonaparté, it is useless for you to contend with Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury!——And, not only has our prosperity been increasing along with the increase of bank notes, but, which is something truly curious, the value of our silver and gold, and of every thing else, even down to our bread and cheese, has also been increasing, and, except in peculiar cases, this increase has kept an exact pace with that of the bank notes! Happy, thrice happy, people!—Lord King stated, that, though there were, perhaps, few instances, in which English bank notes underwent, as yet, a positive discount, still, they had depreciated, as clearly appeared from the price of standard silver, which, previous to the stoppage of cash payments, was 5*s*. 2*d*. an ounce, and which is now 5*s*. 8*d*. This is a *rise* in the value of silver, or a *fall* in the value of bank notes, of more than nine per centum. There is no arguing against this fact. It is decisive as to the depreciation of bank paper; but, whether that depreciation be a mark of prosperity, or of the contrary, shall be left for Mr. Addington and his supporters to decide——Both Lord Grenville and Lord King alluded to what had been said by Mr. Addington relative to the sin of *hoarding*. They thought the imputation of "unpatriotic motives," extremely absurd. In times of scarcity, they observed, nothing was so common as to hear a clamour against the hoardings of the mealmen, corn-dealers, and farmers; and this clamour was just as unreasonable, but not more, than the clamours of those, who are now railing against persons hoarding money; for that, as in times of scarcity of provisions, the hoarding of corn and flour was the only effectual security against famine, so, in times like the present, the hoarding of money was the means most likely to prevent a total want of the precious metals. Lord Hawkesbury observed, that his colleague, Mr. Addington, recognizing as he did, the principles of freedom of trade, could not, in a tone of censure, have alluded to the amassing of gold and silver as objects of *commerce*, but only to the hoardings occasioned by a *want of confidence in the country*. To this Lord King replied, that, as to the blame cast on persons whom a want confidence led to hoard, it put him in mind of the history of the assignats. Robespiere, his lordship said, in order to re-

store confidence, passed a decreee to prevent people from keeping more than a certain sum of gold or silver in their possession, the effect of which decree was the total annihilation of the assignats.——The hoarders of France were accused of *incivism*; people here are accused of *unpatriotic motives*. The former wanted confidence in Robespierre's government, the latter in the government of Mr. Addington, who is not less the cause of national ruin in political, than in commercial concerns. The contemptuous opinion which the world entertains of his administration, keeps all the courts of Europe aloof from us; it has dipped us into a most dangerous dispute with America; it has shaken the confidence, which foreigners have heretofore had in our pecuniary establishments, and our public securities; and, amidst all this, shall the people be blamed, if they wish to provide a few shillings, which is all that seems to be now left, against an hour of calamity? Shall every man be accused of "baseness" (that's the word he made use of) if he refuses, by way of proof of his confidence in Mr. Addington, to suffer his children to starve for want of bread? Besides, Mr. Jekyll, who first complained, in parliament, of the unpatriotic practice of hoarding, and whose observations the minister highly applauded, seems, when in asserting, upon the authority of a banking-house, that, unless hoarding was "put a stop to," there would not, in a short time, be any hard-cash to be seen; when citing this authority, he seems to have forgotten, that there had long been in circulation a pamphlet, written in and published from a banking-house, which pamphlet, agreeably to its title, inculcates the doctrine, that "*guineas are an unnecessary and expen-*" *sive incumbrance*," and that there ought to be no currency but that of paper. From such a quarter, instead of a complaint against hoarders of hard money, one would naturally have expected an eulogium on their useful labours, for what can be more pleasing or of greater utility than that which tends to rid us of "an unnecessary incumbrance?" It has, indeed, been very well, and perhaps, very truly observed, that, as familiarity seldom fails to create contempt, guineas may now be viewed, in banking houses, as well as every where else, with a little more respect than formerly; but this circumstance, it is to be presumed, ought by no means to weigh against those who are vying with the bankers, in testifying this respect.——At the close of the conversation in the house of lords, the Duke of Norfolk observed, that if ministers would, whenever the bank-directors pleased, come to parliament and obtain a law to protect thsoe directors against the legal demands of their creditors, it might be feared, that, in return, those directors might, at some time or other, give ministers such aid as would enable them to dispense, for a time at least, with the concurrence of parliament. In answer to this, Lord Hawkesbury denied, in the most positive terms, that the bill was introduced at the *request*, or even at the *suggestion*, of the bank directors. There was, indeed, an *incontestible proof* of this, and it is a wonder his lordship did not cite it; to wit; that the bill is to "*restrain*" the directors from paying in specie, which, therefore, they are, doubtless, very desirous of doing! But, why then, not take off the *restraint?* Why not let these gentlemen give a loose to their noble natures?—The fact is, that this connection between the bank and government, that is to say, between the bank directors, and all the bankers and partners in banking-houses through the kingdom, on the one part, and the ministers on the other part, is one of the new and great points of our national situation, and one of the principal causes of our disgraceful acquiesence in every measure, the *immediate* object of which is the increase of *factitious* wealth. Let the Nobles, let the Clergy, let the Gentry, let the Merchant and Manufacturer, think well of, and be duly prepared for, the final consequences of this connection. It is an object, which the statesman, who would rescue his country from ruin, ought to have constantly in view. He must, indeed, expect to be loaded with obloquy by the numerous and the ever-active swarm of paper-dealers, and by the news-papers, almost the whole of which these dealers have, either directly or indirectly, at their command; but, that obloquy he must set at defiance; the current, or rather the torrent of events, which is fast rolling on, will soon wipe from his memory the recollection of the falsehood and abuse, with which he is now assailed. When one looks forward only to the distance of five or six years; when one considers, not what *may*, but what *must* happen before the end of that time, with what contempt, or rather, with what perfect indifference, one looks down upon those ignorant and venomous beings, who are railing at and cursing every man, who has the sense (and it does not want much) to perceive, and the honesty to forewarn them of, the dangers and calamities that await them!

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Letter IV.

FROM A CONTINENTAL OBSERVER.

Hamburgh, Nov. 4, 1803.

Sir,—In my three former letters, I took the liberty of discussing four questions, relating to the proposition which your correspondent Inquisitor had previously made, for the open and complete restoration of the ancient French monarchy, in the person of Louis XVIII. the lawful heir to the throne. You may, perhaps, have thought me incompetent to the discussion of a subject so important; but I must beg your forbearance a little longer, while I offer some reflections on the principle which ought, and must, constitute the basis of that grand and glorious project.——The congress proposed by Inquisitor, is intended chiefly for the regulation of the respective interests of the different states of Europe; and, among others, of the re-established French monarchy. Undoubtedly, it will also combine and direct the various means of adjustment, which circumstances may render necessary. All these are points, however, upon which it becomes me to preserve a respectful silence.——But what I propose to examine is, the principle by which the power to be given to Louis XVIII. for the internal government of France, should be regulated.—What, then, will be the previous stipulations which will be made with the French, relative to the great changes which must take place in the internal regulation of the kingdom? Will they be told that every thing shall remain in its present state: or, on the contrary, will it be agreed that every thing shall be restored, as nearly as possible, to the state in which it was before the revolution: or, will they acquiesce in a state of *mezzo-termine* which will leave some of the most durable traits of the revolution, and will not completely obliterate the rest: or, rather, will not all explanations relative to these objects be carefully avoided?——By attempting to put a period to the revolution, and to destroy the revolutionary government, Great Britain attempts the overthrow of that which is unlawful in its nature, iniquitous in its operation, and ever dangerous in its consequences: and, by the re-establishment of the monarchical authority, she performs an act which is just, lawful, and good. The revolution, though in reality so strong and so rich, is, nevertheless, destitute of all right; and, by all her efforts, has never acquired what rebellion can never produce. The rights of the lawful Sovereign are, therefore, as perfect as if they had never been violated: and, to re-establish the monarchy is therefore, speaking strictly with regard to its rights, to replace it as it was, and to endow it with the same power which it possessed before the revolution. Generally speaking, it would be more easy to re-establish it, simple and entire, than with modifications, such as they may be, which would open a door to new discontents and new struggles, both now and hereafter, and would render more complicated that which cannot be too plain. By adopting that principle, Europe would find it of great advantage in promoting and accelerating the restoration; and it would be of greater advantage in future, because the King would thereby be rendered better able to perform the engagements which he might have made with other states, at the important moment of his re-establishment. France would also find it of infinite benefit to her internal tranquillity and security. Before, it would have been impossible for her to be governed without the aid of military power, because all the bonds of authority were broken: but the revolutionary government has rendered the king an essential service, by taking upon itself, all the odium of an authority preserved by such means. I believe that there is scarcely an individual to be found, who does not think that France ought, at this time, to be governed by a power perfectly free, and totally unshackled. For my part I go further, for I think it absolutely necessary, that at first, the Monarch should be endowed with a power superior to that which he possessed before the revolution.—I am aware that it will be said, that I make France but a poor present, in restoring her a government, against the abuses of which so much complaint has been made: a government where the authority of the Prince is not sufficiently limited; in fact, a government which, when we recollect the wonderful ease with which it was overthrown, must be supposed to conceal great and numerous defects. This objection is plausible; and, therefore, lest any should be misled by it, let us examine its force.——Abuses in government are like rust, they attach themselves to that which is most hard and most solid; and nothing but the most assiduous care can prevent them from destroying it by slow and almost imperceptible degrees. This care constitutes one of the most essential parts of the art of governing. If we examine the various governments of the world, ancient as well as modern, we shall always find that it is this rust which, sooner or later, produces their decay. The more closely we investigate this subject, the more certain will be our conviction. For my part, I do not think that, before the revolution, the laws of

France were more copious in abuses than those of the greatest part of the other powers of Europe: and some, most assuredly possessed infinitely more. Those abuses were never the cause of the revolution: and even the attempts have been feeble, which have been made to extenuate it by an excuse so overloaded with idle declamation, but so destitute of proof. The abuses of the laws should not be confounded with the abuses of individuals. Where there are laws (I do not mean perfect laws, for they are no where to be found, but laws sufficiently good) the Sovereign possesses the means of correcting the abuses of individuals. Besides, the ancient French government has been completely reduced to dust; and the object, now to be accomplished, is not its re-establishment but its resurrection. The old rust has disappeared with the metal; and some time, at least, must elapse before new rust can be formed. The universal necessity that would exist of repairing the injuries which have been sustained, would alone, check the progress of new abuses, for a considerable time; and the firm hand of a kind, active, and intelligent Monarch, would repress those which might show a disposition to revive. But why should I talk of abuses! Will the maniac, who has torn himself and wounded his attendants, during the paroxysms of his fury, think of complaining of a kind genius who subjects him to a regimen which will effect his recovery? Now, all is abuse: abuse is the very essence of the system The French will not be perverse; they would be willing to pay dearly for the pleasure of breathing freely under the government of their king, even though some of its old abuses were in its train; but they had rather that the thing was done, than that they themselves should have it to do.—— The notions which prevail in England respecting the limitation of the regal power, and the principles upon which that branch of the British constitution is formed, are different from those which prevailed in France; and I think, with many others, that what may be very proper in the one country, may be totally unsuitable for the other. It would be an endless task to enter into the proof of this opinion. Besides, it must not be thought that there was no limitation to that power in France: it may as well be said, that an unlimited government is the best thing, which I am far from allowing; or that France has been perfectly governed by all her kings; a thing which is not only untrue, but improbable. If the ancient French government was not limited, how did it happen that persons and property were so well secured, and that population, agriculture, prosperity, wealth, and innumerable other advantages had arrived at the height at which they were found? The destructions of the revolution, the dreadful havoc which it has made of the materials of monarchical France, and the abundance which remains, even after so many ravages, should convince Europe, that the ambition of those who calumniated her was, not to reform, but to destroy; and that if her resources had been differently employed, they would have been sufficient to render her happy for ages. To explain these various limitations, so widely scattered, but so little noticed, would require an extensive development, and would unfold circumstances, which would, probably, be new to great part of the world; but which certainly could not be properly introduced here. I may be told, perhaps, that if the restored monarch ought, at first, to possess an increase of power, (as I think he ought) then, there will certainly be no limitation; because it is in the nature of things that all power should tend to its own aggrandizement, and therefore, there is every reason to believe, that, instead of immediately returning to the natural bounds of his authority, the monarch will habitually and perpetually strive to enlarge them. I will not say, in answer to this, that if France is destined by Providence to bow, for ever, under arbitrary power, I should complain less under the yoke of the Bourbons, than under the bitter lash of a Director or a Consul. No; this unfortunate extension of power would be the last of the melancholy gifts of the revolution; it would be a sort of temporary regal dictatorship, which would exact no privilege or right for the future, and which would act only by exception. I doubt not, that Louis XVIII. would begin by avowing this himself; and his evident interest would certainly be to conform to the true principles of the French government, so often acknowledged by his august ancestors. The authority of the Prince, once more restored to vigour, would require no increase; and it would be essential to his interest that it should be preserved moderate. Does it not follow, then, that the wise and temperate exercise of this authority, would daily prove to the French that they no longer lived under the arbitrary sway and brazen laws of an usurper, but under the mild and protecting laws of their legitimate Monarch, who has no interest but their happiness, and whose constant employment would be in securing rather than constraining their liberty? The force of events alone, which might at first, necessarily tend to an extension of power, would afterwards, necessarily tend to

restore moderation.—— If the French monarchy is destroyed, let it not, therefore, be said that it should have been destroyed. The numerous *personal* errors of that government, which, at the time, may have appeared to the inattentive or undiscerning, as harmless, or even advantageous, have since made forcible impressions on the greatest part of those who possess upright minds and honest hearts. Now that we can, at a glance, compare the daily conduct of the French government, particularly from the year 1787, to the ever memorable 14th of July, 1789, with the constant effects of that conduct, we must be very weak indeed to suppose any thing else possible than that it must have been overthrown. But the faults of individuals are not the faults of the thing itself. The truth is, that the revolutionary party would not have prospered as it has, and, indeed, would never have prospered effectually, if those persons who had the greatest influence in the government, had not from weakness and from the intoxication of novelty, as well as from corruption and wickedness, abandoned it to the direction of the very party that sought its destruction. Nothing has ever yet been sustained, and nothing ever can be sustained, even against the weakest attack, when the means of its defence are at the disposal of the assailants. Those who have written on the revolution have endeavoured to disguise these things as much as possible. But, if the restoration should be accomplished, truth, liberated from its chains, would be seen rising from among the ruins of the monarchy, and ascending, like the smoke of Abel's sacrifice, to the heavens; and the discoveries which would be then made, together with all the witnesses and proofs which would be brought forward, would destroy that edifice of falsehood and malignity with which Europe was so long deluded, and which, even at this day, some do think, and many affect to think, a sound and beautiful fabric.——The very reason why I think the French government should be clothed with extraordinary power, on its restoration, is because it was hurried by a train of unpardonable weaknesses, into the vortex which overwhelmed it.——Will it be thought possible to prescribe to the French on the one hand, and to the monarch on the other, new and different limits to the regal authority? No: neither would be satisfied. The Prince would find his sceptre weak, at the very moment when it should be powerful; and his subjects would find themselves more humiliated than benefited. To adjust the terms of a social compact for France, would not, even if it were possible, be an easy or trifling affair. Tyranny will pursue her own course in spite of compacts. This is a truth, which in our day, has been so legibly and forcibly written, and in such dreadful characters, that the very recollection is sufficient to terrify those who rely upon the stipulations of a compact as a rampart of defence against the oppression of power. And, does any one suppose that a people who, from any cause whatever, are disposed to revolt, will be restrained by the conditions of a covenant? Will those, who are influenced more by the circumstances and feelings of the moment, than by a regard to their true interest; who, to day, do not think themselves bound by their promises or their deeds of yesterday; and whom every government by which they have been swayed, whether arbitrary or moderate, has, for its own preservation, been obliged to restrain by the most rigorous and the most violent means; will they, I ask, be the willing performers of a contract? And, if there should be no violation of the compact, are there not always real or imaginary pretexts for discontent and revolt? A new compact, though it were the work of angels, would, at best, possess all the uncertainty and all the unpropitiousness of novelty. In those countries where they exist, an ancient and formal compact with their Sovereign is justly regarded as the palladium of their rights; and is, undoubtedly, a jewel of inestimable value. I do not scruple to say, however, that liberty, genuine, rational liberty, the only liberty, indeed, which is worthy of the pursuit of truly honest men, is, at all times, and in all countries, independent of written compacts, and of a nature far superior to that which is established by written constitutions. But, in the present case, the most certain, and evidently, the immediate effect of a new compact would be to declare not only to the people of France, but to the people of all other countries, *that notwithstanding every thing, rebellion answers some good purposes; for if the French had never rebelled, they would never have dictated laws to their monarchs.* It will not be denied, that such a monument of the power of rebellion, will be a most encouraging example for the discontented and seditious of other countries. —— The true and solid compact between the French monarch and the French people is engraved on the hearts of both: it is scattered through the monuments of their history; and is covered with the venerable mould of great antiquity. We should never forget, that if it be feeling, rather than litigiousness, by which the people are led to

rebellion, it is feeling also, by which they are brought back to duty.——In short, I think it, at once, more advantageous for Europe, and especially for England; more just in itself; more judicious under the present circumstances of the Prince and his kingdom; and above all, more agreeable to the wishes and inclinations of the French people, that Louis XVIII. should be re-established, without any restriction or limitation, whatever, of the authority which he is to exercise in the internal government of France.——I am, &c. &c. &c.

ON INVASION.

Sir,——While nothing but invasion is talked of, will you permit me, amongst others, to say a little on that subject, through your publication. I pretend not to inspiration, I pretend not to hold the elements in my power, to let them loose against the plundering hordes of France, if they ever should be so mad as to leave their harbours and venture from under the protection of their own batteries, or horse artillery and demi brigades, marching along shore to cover the craft that is said to be intended to bring them to our shores; but, I must, undoubtedly, pretend to have an opinion as well as those hatching alarms behind their desks, who know as much of the movements of squadrons and flotillas as the giants at Guildhall, and whose pens perform their tasks like the figures at St. Dunstan's. Of all that has appeared on the subject, that most excellent paper in your Register, Vol. IV. p. 296 et seq. is most consonant to my ideas. The writer appears to have understood his subject, it is discussed with professional knowledge and coolness; the trumpet of alarm is not sounded by ignorance, or by the breath of a venal hireling, and you will excuse me for preferring the opinions therein manifested before all others I have seen or heard, as agreeing with my own, and being consistent with that knowledge necessary to form a just one on the subject. Who, that is possessed of any information, can with temper, read the stupid and ignorant opinions daily trumpeted forth in hireling newspapers.——"The French will be over "in a fortnight; the enemy's preparations "are nearly completed, and he may be ex-"pected in a short time."——But I have no patience to transcribe more of these effusions. The Morning Post, in particular, is continually squalling out invasion, in the true ministerial tone of timidity, and has succeeded so far as to frighten the *old women*, in some places on the sea coast, from their habitations, and it is said, the editor, being seized by the ministerial panic, disposed of the paper for fear of a trip to Cayenne, and like a *safe politician*, he now blusters under the rose. What, Sir, can be the aim of such men, unless it be to blind the nation from beholding the imbecile measures of those weak and ill informed men, whom you have emphatically stiled the "*safe politicians*." But, if these men should hire from the purse of the Treasury, all the venal trumpets of the press, are we to surrender our common sense to their bawling? Are those who have gained professional knowledge and experience from long service, are they to be led by the nose by ministerial hirelings, bawling out "invasion! invasion! the plunderers are "embarked, they may be expected before "the end of the month?"——Are we to believe Buonaparté holds the winds in his fists, and that, with them, he will blow the veteran British squadrons off the seas, and puff over his own Muskitto fleet to our shores, laden with myriads of modern Goths, Vandals, and Huns? Are we to believe an *hundred thousand Frenchmen* are to be embarked in a few hours, and in as many more are to reach our shores? Are we to believe, that which has never been performed by the skill, valour, or desperation of men, from the creation of the world until this day, because the hirelings of a weak, timid, and selfish ministry are continually sounding it in our ears, that our attention may be drawn from scrutinizing their inefficient measures, ill-digested plans, and mad profusion of expense, only calculated to alarm the people, and increase their own influence by having jobs to dispose of, in throwing up lines, and tearing down hedges and thickets. My pen is here ready to hide itself for shame. O! Britain, how art thou obscured under a cloud of weakness and ignorance! Are we, Sir, in matters of such importance, to be swayed by Mr. Addington and those of his puny colleagues, who know, comparatively speaking, as much of what our ships are capable of performing, and Buonaparté's *bum-boats*, as they know of the Man in the Moon? No, Sir, we are Britons, not to be intimidated by the cries of cowardice, or the enraptured place-lover's whine.——Let us be prepared as if the plunderers of Europe could come; but let us dare them to come; let us shake the trident of our power in their face, and alarm their shores with the thunders of our strength. Shall "seven hundred "thousand Britons in arms," be at all alarmed at meeting the Hero of Italy, Acre, and Egypt, at the head of all the force he can muster in France, though he had a road to

march over upon, as broad as the sea that rolls between? But such an immense force is of no avail in the hands of men who know not how to direct it; where shall we look for examples of their wisdom and firmness? In the fatal and disgraceful peace of Amiens, of which they once boasted, but now brand with the epithet of fool those who ever believed it should last? In saying this, they place themselves in the front rank, or if they decline being stationed there, they must allow themselves to be arch-hypocrites. Shall we find their wisdom and firmness in suffering a French fleet and army to sail for the West Indies without their express consent, and before the conclusion of peace? The fate of the latter is no excuse. Shall we find them in dismantling the fleet and disbanding the army amidst the most alarming appearances of French encroachment? In tamely suffering the unrelenting persecution of our commerce in the ports of France, and stooping to every indignity before an ambitious and swollen usurper?—In their *Cursory Remarks*, issuing from the Treasury, teeming with ill-advised assurance, where the premier chanticleer is perceived crowing lustily on his dunghill? In their continually sounding the trumpet of alarm through their hireling and venal newspapers, whose editors would turn to the chink of a guinea like a weather-cock in a sudden gust of wind? Can we, Sir, perceive acts of wisdom in any of these, or many more that could be mentioned? You have frequently justly observed, that these venal newspapers do incalculable mischief; many of these laboured to lay Britain at the feet of that devouring monster the French revolution; now they are roaring loudly against the terrible giant, as if it were more dreadful in appearance, than two, four, or seven years ago; as if there were any difference in the desires of convention, directory, or consulate; but now they find their account in supporting the Treasury Bench. These are your goose-quill heroes, who marshal armies, place campaigns, embark hosts in feeble flotillas, that are to brave the thunder of the British navy, which has braved that of the world, defy the elements that have driven it off the seas, and come safely to our shores lumbered with the hordes of revolutionary France, inured to blood, and adepts in the art of plundering nations. But, Sir, despising the calculations of those goose-quill heroes, who like parrots talk of what they do not understand; with your correspondent signed a "*Friend to my Country*," I think it would be a glorious day for this country and Europe, when the First Consul and an hundred thousand of his troops left the shores of France. Do you believe him in earnest? Let him try his fortune in the enterprize! Think you that he views, without fear, our squadrons waiting with impatience for his approach, burning with ardour to signalize themselves against the inveterate enemies of their country, and revolving the most terrible deeds that arms can accomplish. The Morning Post, that trumpet of a timid and imbecile ministry, amongst other notes of alarm, says, the French are bellowing like bulls to be let loose on England.——Let them bellow! Will the bull bellow when he hears the roar of the lion? Where will be French bravado when destitute of the protection of their own batteries, the avenging thunders of the British navy, roused to the utmost fury, fall upon them? Will they then bellow to tread on English ground, or cry to regain their own shores? Those who might escape the tremendous scene of destruction, crowded together in boats, their joints would be for a time benumbed and palsied, besides being sick and powerless from the tossing of the waves, they would at that moment offer an easy conquest to undisciplined valour, but when met by the chosen troops of these kingdoms, ardent to cope with them in the full exercise of their strength, what would be their fate?——Is not the present position of France the very kind of warfare, that Tallyrand told Lord Whitworth would be pursued? Menace us with invasion! continually menacing! They may encamp near the sea coast, build gun boats, creep with them along shore, practise embarkation and debarkation in their harbours, all this farce the First Consul may perform, and by it alarm a timid ministry with an immense force under their controul, greater than that of France and her subjugated allies; by his maœuvres of seeming preparation, he may stupify more their already somniferous pericraniums, all this will answer his purpose, by keeping up the show of invasion he will put us to vast expense, while men are opposed to him destitute of every qualification absolutely necessary for their office in these eventful days. And are we, Sir, to hold our peace under a ministry more than half petrified by fear? who are much more eager in contriving how to keep their places, than how the war is to be carried on with vigour and effect, how our immense military force is to be employed in humbling the lawgiver to the potentates on the continent. Let men be called to direct the great concerns of the nation possessed of talent and energy, whose knowledge and capacities are equal to any undertaking, and whose souls are firm as a rock,

braving the fury of the thundering billows. Then might we expect to see other measures adopted, than this degrading and everlasting system of defence; then might we hear of the sea ports of France being reduced to ashes, and her troops instead of browsing about Calais, Dunkirk, Boulogne, and other ports in the Channel, would be compelled to march and countermarch to defend their own coast, harassed, fatigued, and worn out. Then should we turn the tables on the crafty politician making a show of invasion, and alarm, and assault his usurped empire from the Elbe to the Adriatic.——But, alas! Sir, until we see the reins of power in other hands, until we see those possessed of greater judgment and skill directing the mighty vessel of state amidst the storm the present weak and timid men have conducted us into, what hope have we to escape from its fury and see better days than the evil ones we have fallen into.—May I be permitted to add a little to your correspondant's excellent observations on invasion, on a part of the subject he seems to have overlooked? While Buonaparté is rivetting the eyes of our appalled ministry to the coasts in the Channel, he is undoubtedly preparing means in the Mediterranean for the invasion of Ireland. Lord Nelson's force is occupied in blockading Toulon, and watching the motions of the French in Italy, but he cannot guard the Gulph of Lyons. From ports there situated, and even from Spanish ports adjacent to the French territory, for what respect does the Consul show to abject, vassal allies when they can serve him in his projects and usurpations, from these ports he may most probably send off single vessels of every description capable of keeping the sea, without convoy, and having troops on board, to rendesvouz in a certain latitude distant from their real destination; to conteract this scheme of craft the space between Gibraltar and Ceuta ought to be strictly guarded, and no vessels suffered to pass without a minute examination of their cargoes, keeping a good look out for any stealing along the Barbary shore to the westward, and if any should escape this pass, another squadron should be stationed without the streight to examine every thing coming into the ocean, whether in mid-channel, or keeping the coast of Barbary, or that of Spain on board. Should they fall in with a convoy, so superior in strength that it would be imprudent to attack it, one frigate might hang on their rear while others made the best of their way to inform the Commander in Chief blockading Brest, and also the Commander in Chief on the Irish station. The last ought frequently to employ ships to scour the ocean to a considerable distance southward, westward, and even northward Our enemy is crafty and enterprising. If he mean, when all his schemes are ripe for execution, to seize on Portugal, may he not send vessels in this manner to the Brazils with troops, who are to be received as usurping conquerors, for that is the tendency of modern French friendship.—I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

HEART OF OAK.

London, 9th Dec. 1803.

UNANIMITY.

Durham, Dec. 1, 1803.

SIR,—I have read with a considerable degree of satisfaction the concluding part of your last number, in which you recommend that species of unanimity which is eminently desirable at the present juncture; an unanimity among the great and leading characters of the age, founded on a sense of the dangers to which we are exposed, and springing from a conviction that a strong, vigorous, and efficient administration is absolutely essential to the preservation of the country. Under the present situation of affairs, it would not be too sanguine to expect, that those statesmen who have proved themselves entitled to that name, should dismiss the habits and forget the rancour of party, and that they should concur in their endeavours to render to their Country and their Sovereign, the greatest service they can perform, by promoting the establishment of an administration which might collect the scattered and unguided energy, might arrange and embody the general patriotism of the country, and might direct with ability, resolution, and vigour, the great, but complicated resources of the Empire. That this is a task which ought not to be entrusted to under-rate abilities is a position that will be very generally admitted, when we consider the condition in which we are placed. After having been indulged in a short, but treacherous repose, having ceded conquest after conquest, after dismantling and disbanding, lulled, moreover, with the soft nepenthe of what was termed "profound peace," we are awakened from our dream, and startled at the grim vision of invasion. The vision, however, partakes more of reality than I could wish, and now assumes a very material form: it assumes a shape to which we must oppose all the energy we can command, which we must combat with all the faculties we possess; not with premature thanks for anticipated

services, not with encomiums upon ourselves, and invectives against Buonaparté, not with the parade of reviews and the consecration of colours, but with spirit, with steadiness, with discipline in the field, with vigour, with authority and wisdom in the Cabinet. Where are we to discover these latter qualities? Where do we find at the helm of the state that knowledge, that discernment, that commanding ability, which is to direct, inform, and animate the exertions of this great country? Look at the eventful history of this administration; analize its component parts, examine it separately and collectively; mark the effect of that mixture of firmness and conciliation which has been repeated to satiety, and which, if at all observable, is to be remarked only for the perverse misapplication of the ingredients of which it is composed; try it by another touchstone, appeal to America for the estimation in which the administration is there held: have their sagacious conduct and expressions with regard to Louisiana increased the respect of America for this country; appeal to Russia, and ask if our treatment of the unfortunate King of Sardinia will give the Russian Cabinet any favourable idea of the policy with which we treat, or the spirit with which we defend our allies? Ask ministers themselves, appeal to their own words, that they have put into the mouth of his Majesty: with the power that is entrusted to them, with the resources committed to their hands, is it sufficient that all our exertions, that the aggregate of our labour, expense, and preparation should be centered in the one thought of repelling invasion? That this is not only to be the limit of our duty (and a more indispensable duty cannot exist), but it is to be the pinnacle of our fame, the acme of our glory. If, therefore, the attempt of invasion be made, and end in discomfiture and disgrace, as I sincerely believe it will, we then have nothing to do, but rend the air with songs of triumph, and bask in the blaze of glory. I confess, Sir, that I am unreasonable enough to expect something more; and I could wish that men were at the head of the affairs of this country, who, by taking the soundest and ablest measures of defence at home, might in the course of events be able to enlarge their views of action and scale of hostility, and by possessing spirit and capacity, might possibly afford the nations upon the continent of Europe an opportunity of rescuing themselves from disgrace, from slavery and ruin.——I am, Sir, your very humble Servant,

A FREEHOLDER.

TO THE EDITOR.

Oxford, Nov. 23, 1803.

SIR,——Impelled by a sense of duty, as well as by an ardent desire of doing justice to a most deserving body of men, who have been grossly insulted and abused by a malevolent writer in your paper, signing himself Philo-Patriæ, I herewith send you a correct statement of the proceedings alluded to in his letter, and request you would insert it in your next Saturday's Register,——As commander of the regiment of Oxford Loyal Volunteers, I judged it expedient to issue an order, forbidding the alteration of any of the regimental arms, accoutrements, or clothing, without my permission, and having, soon after, occasion to observe, that *several of the privates, and some of the non-commissioned officers* had *deviated from it* by *binding* their leather stocks with velvet, (not as Philo-patriæ asserts, by substituting velvet in lieu of leather) I thought it my duty to issue a *second* order, in which, after expressing my concern, at having witnessed a breach of the first, I insisted upon a correction of the fault committed, by an immediate removal of the velvet binding. It may be right, in this place, to observe, that with a view of accommodating as much as possible the different descriptions of persons enrolled in my regiment, I had established three drills in the day, which divided the regiment into three parts, and I have the satisfaction of saying, that although, the last mentioned order was read at the three parades, it was at one of them only that it produced that irregularity of behaviour, so malevolently exaggerated by Philo-Patriæ. At this parade, however, I cannot deny that *several of the privates*, particularly of the light infantry company, *made use of the expression stated in his letter*; but, as soon as such misconduct was reported to me, (for I was not present when it took place,) I addressed, in writing a strong remonstrance upon it to the regiment, in which, I declared my determination of having the order for removing the velvet binding strictly enforced. Upon this remonstrance being read, the individual alluded to, by Philo-Patriæ as the ringleader of the disturbance, muttered something expressive of an intention still to wear the prohibited binding; and the adjutant in my absence, immediately observed, that behaviour so unsoldierlike would not fail of being strongly marked, for the person guilty of it, would probably be removed from the light infantry company, and *balloted* into one of the battalion companies as a man whom none would receive by choice. Nothing more passed

upon parade at this time, and Philo-Patriæ's assertion that the light infantry company unanimously declared their resolution of retiring from the corps if the man was punished, I *believe* to be utterly false.——The next time this portion of the regiment paraded, I took an opportunity of personally addressing the light infantry company, and after pointing out to them in the strongest language I could use, the impropriety of their late conduct, I repeated my determination of having every order issuing from me rigidly enforced; and, I also, addressed myself to the person charged with being the ringleader, informing him of my intention of expelling him from the regiment as an unworthy and dangerous member. In a few hours after delivering this address, I received two letters, of which the following are correct copies.——" Sir D. Mackworth.—" The kind concern you have always ex-" pressed for the welfare of every individual " in the regiment, emboldens me to address " you, and induces me to cherish a hope " that you will not with-hold forgiveness " from faults repented of. That I have er-" red in my conduct towards you this week " I am now fully sensible, though at the mo-" ment, I thought myself justified in acting " as I did. I am no sooner convinced of my " error, than I feel sorry for it. Should you " persist in your determination of expelling " me from the regiment, you will be the " means of rendering me extremely unhappy, " but should your good nature incline you " to milder measures, and lead you to grant " the pardon for which I now petition, you " will have the satisfaction of restoring com-" fort to a man who will willingly exert " that warmth in your defence which be-" trayed him into such conduct as he now " repents of.——I am, Sir, your humble ser-" vant.—JAMES NOTT SMITH."

" Colonel Sir Digby Mackworth,——We " the undersigned members of the light in-" fantry company, address you in behalf of " one of our body, who we are sorry to find " has incurred your displeasure. We do not " pretend to justify his conduct, being " aware that the warmth of the moment has " led him to utter expressions which matu-" rer judgment prompts him to repent of; " but, we trust that the sorrow which he " expresses, and the concesson he has made, " will entitle him to your lenity. We can-" not but consider him as suffering for an " indiscretion, in the commission of which, " *most of us are in some degree implicated.* " We should, therefore, think it highly *dis-*" *graceful* in us to *permit him to be the sole suf-*" *ferer*, without making some effort to re-" lieve him from his present disagreeable si-" tuation. We are too proud, Sir, of the " approbation you have sometimes express-" ed of our general behaviour, not to la-" ment that it should for a moment suffer " in your estimation: but we flatter our-" selves that when the *indiscretions of this* " *week* shall cease to operate on your mind, " our conduct will evince that the light in-" fantry will not be wanting in respect and " attachment to their officers, or in any of " the duties incumbent on zealous de-" fenders of their country.—Signed by 33 " members."——As the foregoing letters do in my opinion reflect high credit on the parties by whom they were written, I have great satisfaction in laying them before the public, who will judge and determine from these documents, and from what I have previously stated, how far the regiment and I are deserving of the stigma attempted to be fixed upon us by a negligent anonymous writer. It is almost unnecessary for me to add, that upon the proofs given of repentance and submission, I readily pardoned the offenders, who having thus returned to a sense of their duty, complied with the order for removing the velvet binding in the strictest manner,——I am, Sir, your humble servant,

DIGBY MACKWORTH, COLONEL.

O. L. V.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

TREATY *between the United States of America and the French Republic, for the cession of Louisiana, concluded at Paris on the 30th April*, 1803.

The President of the United States of America and the First Consul of the French Republic in the name of the French people, desiring to remove all source of misunderstanding relative to objects of discussion mentioned in the 2d and 5th articles of the convention of the 8th Vendemiaire, an 9, (30th September, 1800) relative to the rights claimed by the United States, in virtue of the treaty concluded at Madrid the 27th of October, 1795, between his Catholic Majesty and the said United States, and willing to strengthen the union and friendship which at the time of the said convention was happily re-established between the two nations, have respectively named their plenipotentiaries, to wit, the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the said States, Robert R. Livingston, minister plenipotentiary of the United States, and James Monroe, minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary of the said States, near the Government of the French Republic; and the First Consul, in the name of the French people, citizen Francis Barbé Marbois, minister of the public treasury, who,

after having respectively exchanged their full powers, have agreed to the following articles:—Art. I. Whereas, by the article the 3d of the treaty concluded at St. Idelfonso, the 9th Vendemiaire, an 9, (1st October, 1800) between the First Consul of the French Republic and his Catholic Majesty, it was agreed as follows:—"His Catholic Majesty promises and engages "on his part to cede to the French Republic, "six months after the full and entire execution "of the conditions and stipulations herein re-"lative to his Royal Highness the Duke of "Parma, the colony or province of Louisiana, "with the same extent that it now has in the "hands of Spain, and that it had when France "possessed it; and such as it should be after "the treaties subsequently entered into between "Spain and other States."—And whereas, in pursuance of the treaty, and particularly of the 3d article, the French Republic has an incontestible title to the domain and to the possession of the said territory. The First Consul of the French Republic desiring to give to the United States a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby cede to the said United States, in the name of the French Republic, for ever and in full sovereignty, the said territory, with all its rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the same manner as they have been acquired by the French Republic in virtue of the abovementioned treaty, concluded with his Catholic Majesty.—Art. II. In the cession made by the proceeding article are included the adjacent islands belonging to Louisiana, all public lots and squares, vacant lands, and all public buildings, fortifications, barracks, and other edifices which are not private property. The archives, papers and documents, relative to the domain and sovereignty of Louisiana and its dependencies, will be left in the possession of the commissaries of the United States, and copies will be afterwards given in due form to the magistrates and municipal officers, of such of the said papers and documents as may be necessary to them.—Art. III. The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the union of the United States, and admitted, as soon as possible, according to the principals of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean-time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.—Art. IV. There shall be sent by the government of France a commissary to Louisiana, to the end that he do every act necessary, as well to receive from the officers of his Catholic Majesty the said country and its dependencies, in the name of the French Republic, if it has not been already done, as to transmit it in the name of the French Republic to the commissary or agent of the United States.—Art. V. Immediately after the ratification of the present treaty by the President of the United States, and in case that of the French Consul's shall have been previously obtained, the commissary of the French Republic shall remit all military posts of New Orleans, and other parts of the ceded territory, to the commissary or commissaries named by the President to take possession; the troops, whether of France or Spain, who may be there, shall cease to occupy any military post from the time of taking possession, and shall be embarked as soon as possible in the course of three months after the ratification of this treaty.—Art. VI. The United States promise to execute such treaties and articles as may have been agreed between Spain and the tribes and nations of the Indians, until, by mutual consent of the United States and the said tribes or nations, other suitable articles shall have been agreed upon.—Art. VII. As it is reciprocally advantageous to the commerce of France and the United States to encourage the communication of both nations for a limited time in the country ceded by the present treaty, until general arrangements relative to the commerce of both nations may be agreed on: it has been agreed between the contracting parties, that the French ships coming directly from France or any of her colonies, loaded only with the produce and manufactures of France or her said colonies; and the ships of Spain coming directly from Spain or any of her colonies, loaded only with the produce or manufactures of Spain or her colonies, shall be admitted during the space of twelve years in the port of New Orleans, and in all other legal ports of entry within the ceded territory, in the same manner as the ships of the United States coming directly from France or Spain, or any of their colonies, without being subject to any other or greater duty on merchandize, or other or greater tonnage than that paid by the citizens of the United States.—During the space of time above-mentioned, no other nation shall have a right to the same privileges in the ports of the ceded territory: the twelve years shall commence three months after the exchange of ratifications, if it shall take place in France, or three months after it shall have been notified at Paris to the French government, if it shall take place in the United States; it is however well understood, that the object of the above articles is to favor the manufactures, commerce, freight and navigation of France and of Spain, so far as relates to the importations that the French and Spanish shall make into the said ports of the United States, without in any sort affecting the regulations that the United States may make concerning the exportation of the produce and merchandize of the United States, or any right they may have to make such regulations.—Art. VIII. In future, and for ever after the expiration of the twelve years, the ships of France shall be treated upon the footing of the most favored nations in the ports above mentioned.—Art. IX. The particular convention signed this day by the respective ministers, having for its object to provide for the payment of debts due to the citizens of the United States by the French Republic, prior to the 30th of September, 1800, (8th Vendemiaire, an 9,) is approved, and to have its execution in the same manner as if it had been inserted in this present treaty, and it shall be ratified in the same form and in the same time,

so that the one shall not be ratified distinct from the other.—Another particular convention signed at the same date as the present treaty, relative to a definitive rule between the contracting parties, is in the like manner approved, and will be ratified in the same form, and in the same time, and jointly.—Art. X. The present treaty shall be ratified in good and due form, and the ratification shall be exchanged in the space of six months after the date of the signature by the ministers plenipotentiary, or sooner if possible.—In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed these articles in the French and English languages; declaring nevertheless that the present treaty was originally agreed to in the French language; and have thereunto affixed their seals.—Done at Paris, the 10th day of Floreal, in the 11th year of the French Republic, and the 30th of April, 1803.

BARBÉ MARBOIS.

ROB. R. LIVINGSTON, JAS. MONROE.

Convention referred to in Art. IX. *of the preceding Treaty, for settling the Terms of the Payment for Louisiana.*

The President of the United States of America, and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, in consequence of the treaty of cession of Louisiana, which has been signed this day, wishing to regulate definitively every thing which has relation to the said cession, have authorised to this effect the plenipotentiaries, that is to say: the President of the United States has, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the said states, nominated for their plenipotentiaries, Robert R. Livingston, minister plenipotentiary of the United States, and James Monroe, minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary of the said United States, near the government of the French Republic; and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, has named as plenipotentiary of the said Republic, the citizen Francis Barbé Marbois; who, in virtue of their full powers, which have been exchanged this day, have agreed on the following articles:—Art. I. The government of the United States engages to pay to the French government, in the manner specified in the following article, the sum of sixty millions of francs, independent of the sum which shall be fixed by another convention, for the payment of the debts due by France to citizens of the United States.—Art. II. For the payment of the sum of sixty millions of francs, mentioned in the preceding article, the United States shall create a stock of eleven millions, two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, bearing an interest of six per cent. per annum, payable half yearly in London, Amsterdam, or Paris, amounting by the half year to three hundred and thirty-seven thousand. five hundred dollars, according to the proportions which shall be determined by the French government to be paid at either place; the principal of the said stock to be reimbursed at the treasury of the United States, in annual payments of not less than three millions of dollars each; of which the first payment shall commence fifteen years after the date of the exchange of ratifications; this stock shall be transferred to the government of France, or to such person or persons as may be authorised to receive it, in three months at most after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, and after Louisiana shall be taken possession of in the name of the government of the United States.—It is further agreed, that if the French government should be desirous of disposing of the said stock, to receive the capital in Europe, at shorter terms, its measures for that purpose shall be taken so as to favour, in the greatest degree possible, the credit of the United States, and to raise to the highest price the said stock.—Art. III. It is agreed that the dollar of the United States, specified in the present convention, shall be fixed at five francs 3333 10000ths, or five livres, eight sous tournois.—The present convention shall be ratified in good and due form, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the space of six months, to date from this day, or sooner if possible.—In faith of which, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the above articles, both in the French and English languages, declaring, nevertheless, that the present treaty has been originally agreed on and written in the French language; to which they have hereunto affixed their seals—Done at Paris the 10th of Floreal, eleventh year of the French Republic (30th April, 1803).

BARBÉ MARBOIS.

ROB. R. LIVINGSTON. JAS. MONROE.

Convention, referred to in Art. IX. of the preceding treaty, for providing for the payment of debts, due to the Citizens of the United States, by the French Republic,

The President of the United States of America, and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, having by a treaty of this date terminated all difficulties relative to Louisiana, and established on a solid foundation the friendship which unites the two nations, and being desirous, in compliance with the second and fifth articles of the convention of the 8th Vendemiaire, ninth year of the French Republic (30th Sept. 1800) to secure the payment of the sums due by France to the citizens of the United States have respectively nominated as plenipotentiaries, that is to say: the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of their Senate, Robert R. Livingston, minister plenipotentiary, and James Monroe, minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary of the said states, near the government of the French Republic; and the First Consul, in the name of the French people, in the citizen Francis Barbé Marbois, minister of the public treasury: who, after having exchanged their full powers, have agreed to the following articles.——Art. 1. The dbets due by France to citizens of the United States, contracted before the 8th of Vendemiaire, ninth year of the French Republic (30th Sept. 1800) shall be paid according to the following regulations, with interest at six per cent. to commence from the period when the accounts and vouchers were pre-

sented to the French government.—Art. II. The debts provided for by the preceding article are those whose result is comprised in the conjectural note annexed to the present convention, and which, with the interest, cannot exceed the sum of twenty millions of Francs. The claims comprised in the said note, which fall within the exceptions of the following articles, shall not be admitted to the benefit of this provision.—Art. III. The principal and interests of the said debts shall be discharged by the United States, by orders drawn by their minister plenipotentiary on their treasury; these orders shall be payable sixty days after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty and the conventions signed this day; and after possession shall be given of Louisiana by the commissaries of France to those of the United States.—Art. IV. It is expressly agreed, that the preceding articles shall comprehend no debts but such as are due to the citizens of the United States, who have been and are yet creditors of France, for supplies for embargoes and prizes made at sea, in which the appeal has been properly lodged within the time mentioned in the said convention, 8th Vendemiaire, ninth year, (30th Sept. 1800).—Art. V. The preceding articles shall apply only, first, to captures of which the council of prizes shall have ordered restitution, it being well understood that the claimant cannot have resource to the United States, otherwise than he might have had to the government of the French Republic, and only in case of insufficiency of the captors; 2d, the debts mentioned in the said fifth article of the convention contracted before the 8th Vendemiaire, an. 9, (30. Sept. 1800) the payment of which has been heretofore claimed of the actual government of France, and for which the creditors have a right to the protection of the United States; the said fifth article does not comprehend prizes whose condemnation has been or shall be confirmed; it is the express intention of the contracting parties not to extend the benefit of the present convention to réclamations of American citizens, who shall have established houses of commerce in France, England, or other countries than the United States, in partnership with foreigners, and who by that reason and the nature of their commerce ought to be regarded as domiciliated in the places where such houses exist. All agreements and bargains concerning merchandize, which shall not be the property of American citizens, are equally excepted from the benefit of the said convention, saving, however, to such persons their claims in like manner as if this treaty had not been made.—Art. VI. And the different questions which may arise under the preceding article may be fairly investigated, the ministers plenipotentiary of the United States shall name three persons, who shall act from the present and provisionally, and who shall have full power to examine, without removing the documents, all the accounts of the different claims already liquidated by the bureaus established for this purpose by the French Republic, and to ascertain whether they belong to the classes designated by the present convention and the principles established in it; or if they are not in one of its exceptions and on their certificate, declaring that the debt is due to an American citizen or his representative, and that it existed before the 8th Vendemiaire, 9th year (30th Sept. 1800) the debtor shall be entitled to an order on the treasury of the United States, in the manner prescribed by the third article.—Art. VII. The same agents shall likewise have power, without removing the documents, to examine the claims which are prepared for verification, and to certify those which ought to be admitted by uniting the necessary qualifications, and not being comprised in the exceptions contained in the present convention.—Art. VIII. The same agents shall likewise examine the claims which are not prepared for liquidation, and certify in writing those which in their judgment ought to be admitted to liquidation.—Art. IX. In proportion as the debts mentioned in these articles shall be admitted, they shall be disharged with interest at six per cent. by the treasury of the United States.—Art. X. And that no debt which shall not have the qualifications above mentioned, and that no unjust or exorbitant demand may be admitted, the commercial agent of the United States at Paris, or such other agent as the minister plenipotentiary of the United States shall think proper to nominate, shall assist at the operations of the bureaus, and co-operate in the examinations of the claims; and if this agent shall be of opinion that any debt is not completely proved, or if he shall judge that it is not comprised in the principles of the fifth article above mentioned, and if notwithstanding his opinion, the bureaus established by the French government should think that it ought to be liquidated, he shall transmit his observations to the board established by the United States, who, without removing documents, shall make a complete examination of the debt and vouchers which support it, and report the result to the minister of the United States. The minister of the United States shall transmit his observations, in all such cases, to the minister of the treasury of the French Republic, on whose report the French government shall decide definitively in every case.—The rejection of any claim shall have no other effect than to exempt the United States from the payment of it, the French government reserving to itself the right to decide definitively on such claim so far as it concerns itself.—Art. XI. Every necessary decision shall be made in the course of a year, to commence from the exchange of ratifications, and no reclamation shall be admitted afterwards.—Art. XII. In case of claims for debts contracted by the government of France with citizens of the United States since the 8th Vendemiaire, 9th year (30th Sept. 1800), not being comprised in this convention, may be pursued, and the payment demanded in the same manner as if it had not been made.—Art. XIII. The present convention shall be ratified in good and due form, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in six months from the date of the signature of the ministers plenipotentiary, or sooner if possible.—In faith of which, the respective Ministers Plenipotentiary have signed the above articles both in the French and English languages, declaring

nevertheless that the present treaty has been originally agreed on and written in the French language; to which they have hereunto affixed their seals. Done at Paris, the tenth of Floreal, eleventh year of the French Republic, 30th April, 1803.

BARBÉ MARBOIS.

ROB. R. LIVINGSTON. JAS. MONROE.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

MESSAGE *from the President of the United States of America to both Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of an Extraordinary Session, held at the City of Washington, on the 17th October*, 1803.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States,—In calling you together, fellow citizens, at an earlier day than was contemplated by the act of the last session of Congress, I have not been insensible to the personal inconveniencies necessarily resulting from an unexpected change in your arrangements; but matters of great public concernment have rendered this call necessary; and the interests you feel in these will supercede in your minds all private considerations.——Congress witnessed, in their late session, the extraordinary agitation produced in the public mind, by the suspension of our right of deposit at the port of New-Orleans, no assignment of another place having been made according to treaty. They were sensible that the continuance of their privation would be more injurious to our nation, than any consequences which could flow from any mode of redress. But reposing just confidence in the good faith of the government whose officer had committed the wrong, friendly and reasonable representations were resorted to, and the right of deposit was restored.—— Previous, however, to this period, we had not been unaware of the danger to which our peace would be perpetually exposed, whilst so important a key to the commerce of the western country remained under foreign power. Difficulties too were presenting themselves as to the navigation of other streams, which, arising within our territories, pass through those adjacent. Propositions had therefore been authorized for obtaining, on fair conditions, the sovereignty of New-Orleans, and of other possessions in that quarter interesting to our quiet, to such extent as was deemed practicable; and the provisional appropriation of two millions of dollars, to be applied and accounted for by the President of the United States, intended as part of the price, was considered as conveying the sanction of Congress to the acquisition proposed. The enlightened government of France saw, with just discernment, the importance of both nations of such liberal arrangements as might best and permanently promote the peace, friendship, and interests of both: and the property and sovereignty of all Louisiana, which had been restored to them, has, on certain conditions, been transferred to the United States by instruments bearing date the 30th of April last. When these shall have received the constitutional sanction of the Senate, they will, without delay, be communicated to the Representatives, also, for the exercise of their functions as to those conditions which are within the powers vested by the constitution in Congress. Whilst the property and sovereignty of the Mississippi and its waters secure an independent outlet for the produce of the western states, and an uncontroled navigation through their whole course, free from collision with other powers, and the dangers to our peace from that source, the fertility of the country, its climate and extent, promise, in due season, important aids to our treasury, and ample provision for our posterity, and a wide spread for the blessings of freedom and equal laws.——With the wisdom of Congress it will rest to take those ulterior measures which may be necessary for the immediate occupation and temporary government of the country; for its incorporation into our union; for rendering the change of government a blessing to our newly adopted brethren; for securing to them the rights of conscience and of property: for confirming to the Indian inhabitants their occupancy and self-government, establishing friendly and commercial relations with them, and for ascertaining the geography of the country acquired. Such materials for your information relative to its affairs in general, as the short space of time has permitted me to collect, will be laid before you when the subject shall be in a state for your consideration.——Another important acquisition of territory has also been made, since the last session of Congress. The friendly tribe of Kaskaskia, Indians, with which we have never had a difference, reduced, by the wars and wants of savage life, to a few individuals unable to defend themselves against the neighbouring tribes, has transferred its country to the United States, reserving only for its members what is sufficient to maintain them, in an agricultural way. The considerations stipulated are, that we shall extend to them our patronage and protection, and give them certain annual aids, in money, in implements of agriculture, and other articles of their choice. This country, among the most fertile within our limits, extending along the Mississippi from the mouth of the Illinois, to and up the Ohio, though not so necessary as a barrier, since the acquisition of the other bank, may yet be well worthy of being laid open to immediate settlement, as its inhabitants may descend with rapidity in support of the lower country, should future circumstances expose that to foreign enterprise. As the stipulations, in this treaty also, involve matters within the competence of both houses only, it will be laid before Congress so soon as the Senate shall have advised its ratification.——With many of the other Indian tribes, improvements in agriculture and household manufacture, are advancing; and, with all, our peace and friendship are established on grounds much firmer than heretofore. The measure adopted of establishing trading-houses among them, and of furnishing them necessaries in exchange for their commodities, at such mo-

derate prices as leave no gain, but cover us from loss, has the most conciliatory and useful effect on them, and is that which will best secure their peace and good will.——The small vessels authorised by Congress, with a view to the Mediterranean service, have been sent into that sea; and will be able more effectually to confine the Tripoline cruisers within their harbours, and supersede the necessity of convoy to our commerce in that quarter. They will sensibly lessen the expenses of that service the ensuing year.——A further knowledge of the ground in the north eastern, and north western angles of the United States, has evinced that the boundaries established by the treaty of peace, between the British territories and ours in those parts, were too imperfectly described to be susceptible of execution. It has therefore been thought worthy of attention, for preserving and cherishing the harmony and useful intercourse subsisting between the two nations, to remove, by timely arrangements, what unfavourable incidents might otherwise render a ground of future misunderstanding. A convention has therefore been entered into, which provides for a practicable demarcation of those limits, to the satisfaction of both parties.——An account of the receipts and expenditures of the year ending the 30th of September last, with the estimates for the service of the ensuing year, will be laid before you by the Secretary of the Treasury, so soon as the receipts of the last quarter shall be returned from the more distant states. It is already ascertained, that the amount paid into the treasury, for that year, has been between eleven and twelve millions of dollars, and that the revenue, accrued during the same term, exceeds the sum counted on, as sufficient for our current expenses, and to extinguish the public debt, within the period heretofore proposed.——The amount of debt paid for the same year, is about three millions one hundred thousand dollars, exclusive of interest, and making, with the payment of the preceding year, a discharge of more than eight millions and an half of dollars of the principal of that debt, besides the accruing interest: and there remain in the treasury nearly six millions of dollars. Of these eight hundred and eighty thousand have been reserved for payment of the first instalment due, under the British Convention of January 8, 1802, and two millions are, what have been before mentioned, as placed by Congress under the power and accountability of the President, towards the price of New-Orleans and other territories acquired, which, remaining untouched, are still applicable to that object, and go in diminution of the sum to be funded for it. ——Should the acquisition of Louisiana be constitutionally confirmed and carried into effect a sum of nearly thirteen millions of dollars will then be added to our public debt, most of which is payable after fifteen years; before which term, the present existing debts will all be discharged, by the established operation of the sinking fund. When we contemplate the ordinary, annual, augmentation of impost from increasing population and wealth, the augmentation of the same revenue, by its extension to the new acquisition, and the economies which may still be introduced into our public expenditures, I cannot but hope that Congress, in reviewing their resources will find means to meet the intermediate interest of this additional debt, without recurring to new taxes, and applying to this object only the ordinary progression of our revenue. Its extraordinary increase, in times of foreign war, will be the proper and sufficient fund for any measures of safety or precaution, which that state of things may render necessary in our neutral position.——Remittances for the instalments of our foreign debt having been found practicable without loss it has not been thought expedient to use the power, given by a former act of Congress, of continuing them by reloans, and of redeeming, instead thereof, equal sums of domestic debt, although no difficulty was found in obtaining that accommodation.——The sum of fifty thousand dollars, appropriated by Congress for providing gun-boats, remains unexpended. The favourable and peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi, rendered an immediate execution of that law unnecessary; and time was desirable, in order that the institution of that branch of our force might begin on models the most approved by experience. The same issue of events dispensed with a resort to the appropriation of a million and an half of dollars, contemplated for purposes which were effected by happier means.——We have seen with sincere concern the flames of war lighted up again in Europe, and nations with which we have the most friendly and useful relations, engaged in mutual destruction. While we regret the miseries in which we see others involved, let us bow with gratitude to that kind Providence, which inspiring with wisdom and moderation our late legislative councils, while placed under the urgency of the greatest wrongs, guarded us from hastily entering into the sanguinary contest, and left us only to look on and to pity its ravages. These will be heaviest on those immediately engaged; yet the nations pursuing peace will not be exempt from all evil. In the course of this conflict let it be our endeavour, as it is our interest and desire, to cultivate the friendship of the belligerent nations by every act of justice and of innocent kindness; to receive their armed vessels with hospitality from the distresses of the sea, but to administer the means of annoyance to none; to establish in our harbours, such a police as may maintain law and order; to restrain our citizens from embarking individually in a war in which their country takes no part; to punish severely those persons, citizen or alien, who shall usurp the cover of our flag, for vessels not entitled to it, infecting thereby with suspicion those of real Americans and committing us into controversies for the redress of wrongs not our own; to exact from every nation the observance, towards our vessels and citizens, of those principles and practices which all civilized people acknowledge; to merit the character of a just nation, and maintain that of an independent one, preferring every consequence to insult and habitual

wrong. Congress will consider whether the existing laws enable us efficaciously to maintain this course with our citizens in all places, and with others while within the limits of our jurisdiction; and will give them the new modifications necessary for these objects. Some contraventions of right have already taken place, both within our jurisdictional limits, and on the high seas.——The friendly disposition of the governments from whose agents they have proceeded, as well as their wisdom and regard for justice, leave us in reasonable expectation, that they will be rectified and prevented in future; and that no act will be countenanced by them which threatens to disturb our friendly intercourse. Separated by a wide ocean from the nations of Europe, and from the political interests which entangle them together, with productions and wants which render our commerce and friendship useful to them, and theirs to us, it cannot be the interest of any to assail us, nor ours to disturb them. We should be most unwise indeed were we to cast away the singular blessings of the position in which nature has placed us, the opportunity she has endowed us with of pursuing, at a distance from foreign contentions, the paths of industry, peace, and happiness, of cultivating general friendship, and of bringing collisions of interest to the umpirage of reason, rather than of force. How desirable then must it be, in a government like ours, to see its citizens adopt individually the views, the interests, and the conduct which their country should pursue, divesting themselves of those passions and partialities which tend to lessen useful friendships, and to embarrass and embroil us in the calamitous scene of Europe. Confident, fellow citizens, that you will duly estimate the importance of neutral dispositions towards the observance of neutral conduct, that you will be sensible how much it is our duty to look on the bloody Arena spread before us, with commiseration indeed, but with no other wish than to see it closed, I am persuaded you will cordially cherish these dispositions, in all discussions among yourselves, and in all communications with your constituents. And I anticipate with satisfaction the measures of wisdom, which the great interests now committed to you, will give *you* an opportunity of providing and *myself* that of approving, and of carrying into execution, with the fidelity I owe to my country. THO. JEFFERSON.

October 17, 1803.

INTELLIGENCE.

FOREIGN.——The Arabian rebels have been driven from Mecca and Medina; and, from the weakness of their numbers, will be obliged to retire from the province of Hedjah, to procure re-inforcements.——Alexandria is still in the hands of the Turks, but is closely besieged by the Beys. Proposals, however, have been made by the Porte, to restore to the Beys the same privileges which they formerly possessed, upon condition of their submitting peaceably to his authority.—— New disturbances have broken out in Albania, and the insurgents are aided by the neighbouring Monteregrines.——A strong Turkish army has been marched for the Morea, and the Captain Pacha, with twelve ships, has been dispatched to assist their operations.——The Emperor of Russia has issued an ukase, directing that two peasants out of every five hundred shall be inlisted into the army; by which means it will receive an addition of about forty thousand men.—— Count Marcoff, the Russian Ambassador at the Consular court, has delivered his letters of recall; and, on his return to St. Petersburgh, is to be invested with the blue ribbon.—— From various accounts, it appears that the Emperor Alexander is preparing for the unfavourable termination of some important negotiations which are said to exist between the courts of Petersburgh and Paris.——It is asserted, in the Hamburgh papers, that the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia are now interesting themselves in promoting the preliminary measures of a general pacification of Europe.——The Batavian government has found such difficulty in collecting the extraordinary contribution of two per cent. on all property, that the legislative body have been obliged to decree that those who do not pay their respective proportions according to the manner described by law, shall be proceeded against by personal arrest, sequestration of property, or such other manner as the government may direct.—— In order to favour the trade of neutral bottoms under the Swedish flag, during the war; the legislative body have suspended until eighteen months after a peace with Great-Britain, the ordinance of the States-General which forbids the subjects of Sweden to import into that republic, in their own, or other ships freighted on their account, any merchandize but the produce of Sweden or its colonies.——Relative to the compulsory means which were threatened to be employed for raising money to support the French troops in Hanover, his Britannic Majesty, as Elector, has declared that none of his Hanoverian ministers of state have authority, without his express command, to raise money, or to give security for it.——Letters from the Escurial, published in the *Correspondenten*, state that, on the 30th of October, a convention for securing the neutrality of Spain was concluded between that kingdom and France.——An extraordinary session of the American Congress has been begun at the City of Wash-

ington; and, a bill for altering the mode of balloting for president and vice president, and a bill for carrying the treaty lately concluded with France into execution, have passed the House of Representatives; the treaty, and the conventions with France have received the approbation of the Senate; and a bill authorising the president to employ the army and navy, and eighty thousand militia for taking possession of Louisiana, and vesting the temporary government of the country in his hands, has also passed that body.

DOMESTIC.——Accounts lately received from Jamaica state that many of the negroes in that island had formed a conspiracy against their masters. Kingston was to have been burnt on the night of the 9th of October, and the inhabitants massacred: the plot was, however, discovered, and the fire extinguished in a short time after it had been kindled. Several of the negroes who were concerned in the transaction have been taken and executed.——A morning paper of the 9th instant says, that the judges have decided on the case of Astlett. Nine of their Lordships were of opinion, that, though the Exchequer Bills purloined by him, were not property, on which a criminal conviction could be founded, he was guilty of stealing *paper* valued 39*s*. the property of the Bank; and three were of opinion that his offence was not cognizable by the statutes.—— The Gazette of the 19th of November, contains the appointment of the Right Honourable Henry Addington, George Thynne, Esq. (commonly called Lord George Thynne) Nathaniel Bond, William Brodrick, and Edward Golding, Esqrs. to be Commissioners for executing the office of Treasurer of his Majesty's Exchequer.—— On the 26th, the Right Hon. Thomas Maitland, and the Right Hon. Nathaniel Bond, were, by his Majesty's command, sworn of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, and took their places at the board accordingly.——The King has been pleased to grant the dignity of a Baronet of the United Kingdom to Brook Watson, Esq. Commissary General to his Majesty's forces in Great Britain, and his heirs, with remainders to William Kay, Esq. Deputy Commissary General, (great nephew of Brook Watson, Esq.) and to Brook Kay, his brother.——The King has been pleased to grant the office of Treasurer and Receiver General of the Royal Hospital of Greenwich, to Captain William Henry Jarvis, of the Royal Navy, in the room of the late Admiral Payne.——The King has also been pleased to grant permission unto Major Gen. John Stuart, to receive and wear the Ottoman Imperial Order of the Crescent, conferred on him by the Grand Signior.——His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales has appointed Thomas Tyrwhitt, Esq.: to be Lord Warden of the Stannaries and Admiral of the Duchy ports and harbours in Cornwall and Devon. He has, also, appointed John M'Mahon, Esq. to be Secretary and Keeper of his privy seal and council seal, and Auditor of the Duchy of Cornwall.—— The Gazette of the 8th inst. contains an order of council, dated on the 7th, granting permission to his Majesty's subjects to trade with the colony of Berbice, in the same manner as with the other colonies. It, also, contains an order of council, prolonging the bounties, promised to seamen, landmen, &c. by the proclamations of the 17th of March and 16th of May last, to the 31st of December.— The Minister had great difficulty in obtaining the attendance of a sufficient number of the members of the House of Commons, to go up to his Majesty with the Address on the 24th of November. The Speaker attended at the usual time, and waited more than an hour and a half, with the hope that members enough to form a house would attend in their places. Scarcely any person, however, came, and Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Hobhouse were dispatched in search of members: the lounging-rooms, the coffee-houses, the streets, and even the levee, were stripped; and, at length, with great difficulty they mustered twenty-seven members, who attended the Speaker to the Court. His Majesty had appointed to receive them at three o'clock, but they did not appear until half past four.——In the House of Commons, on the 28th of November, Mr. Vansittart, in reply to a question from Mr. Alderman Combe, "whether the property tax act was to be revised this session?" said, that it was not the intention of Government to bring in any bill on the subject, as they were desirous of giving it a fair trial in its present shape; and that any defects which were found in its operation might then be remedied. The estimates for one hundred thousand seamen were voted by the House on the 30th. On the 2d instant the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved an additional issue of five millions of exchequer bills, and the annual vote of the malt tax and the sums given in lieu of the land tax. On the same evening, some interesting conversation took place on the affairs of Ireland. The bill for continuing the suspension of the issue of cash from the Bank, passed through the committee on

the 3d; it is to continue in force for six months after the ratification of the preliminary articles of peace. On the 5th and 6th two very important debates took place on the bill for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland. On the 9th the army estimates were moved by the Secretary of War, and a very long and interesting debate took place. The ministerial plan of defence was objected to, generally, by Messrs. Windham, Grenville, Fox, and several other members; and with respect to the volunteer system, Mr. Fox declared his entire coincidence with all the opinions which Mr. Windham had expressed.

MILITARY.——The military preparations in the different parts of the Batavian Republic are said to have been of late, in some measure relaxed; and the Hamburgh papers assert, that a great portion of the French troops stationed on the coast are sickly, and that many of these are in the hospitals. Gen. Victor, who commands them, had fixed his head quarters at Utrecht, but has lately removed them to the Hague.—The military preparations at St. Omers, Boulogne, and the neighbouring places, remain nearly in the state in which they were, previous to the visit of the First Consul. Respecting those on the other parts of the coast, except at Bayonne, the late papers are silent. At Bayonne, however, they say that twenty-five thousand men are assembled, under the command of General Augereau.——The French troops in Italy are marching from the interior, towards the Adriatic; and a considerable number of Italian troops, it is said, are to be marched into France, and are to join the invading army on the coast.——Orders have been issued from the Horse-Guards, stating his Majesty's command, that, in case the enemy should land, all officers, below the rank of general officers, who do not belong to any particular regiment, shall report themselves in person to the officer of the district in which they reside. His Royal Highness, the commander in chief, has, at the same time, requested, that all general officers, not employed on the staff, will transmit their names to the adjutant-general.

NAVAL.—Some of the gun-boats and flat-bottomed boats of Boulogne, which had gone out to manœuvre, during the visit of the First Consul at that place, were driven upon the rocks by a storm, which came on suddenly, and were lost; some others got into Calais; but the greatest part returned to the harbour, with very little injury. Small detachments of boats are daily entering Boulogne, which is the grand rendezvous of the flotilla to be employed in the invasion of England, The marine preparations, in the other ports of France, go on as usual.—A French ship of war and frigate lately got out of Brest, and were pursued by a part of Lord Cornwallis's squadron; but, after a very long chase, they escaped.—Orders have been issued, by the Spanish government, for fitting out ships at Cadiz, Ferrol, and several other ports; the whole are to be under the direction of Admiral Gravina.—The Baltic fleet, consisting of about 300 sail of merchantmen, bound for the different ports of Great-Britain, after having been, in some degree, dispersed by the late storms, has arrived safely.—Dispatches have been received from Admiral Duckworth, in the West-Indies, announcing the capture of the French garrisons of Cape Nicola Mole and Port Dauphin, in St. Domingo. Cape Nicola Mole surrendered on the 4th of September. The garrison, consisting of eight hundred and fifty men, were made prisoners of war; and a corvette, transport, and schooner, which were found in the harbour, were taken possession of. Port Dauphin surrendered on the 7th. The garrison and great numbers of the inhabitants were sent to Cape François, on board a flag of truce. The French frigate La Sagesse of thirty-two guns, was found in the harbour. The soldiers and the colonists, in both places, were reduced to the most deplorable condition, by the perpetoal attacks of the Negroes: at Cape Nicola Mole the garrison had, for some time, lived upon horse-flesh. Two French schooners, laden with flour, were captured by one of the ships of Admiral Duckworth's squadron, at about the same time.—On the 2d of October, Captain Wood in the Augusta, off Ushant, fell in with and captured, after a chace of forty-five hours, the French privateer l'Aventure, of twenty guns and a hundred and forty-four men. Two of the Jamaica convoy, which had been captured by the l'Aventure, were retaken at the same time.—On the 9th of October, Captain Merefield, in the sloop Atalante, cruising off Quiberon Bay, discovered two French ketches and a brig, running under point St. Gildas; he immediately attacked them, and succeeded in driving them on shore; where, notwithstanding a constant fire of musquetry and artillery, from some troops on the land, they were destroyed.

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